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Feature 
In this issue we compare Islam in four different countries. Alan Black looks at Islam in 
Pakistan tying it in with society and the political situation,· Morris Lee looks at neigh-
bouring Bangladesh and particularly the mystical Islamic groups; the other two papers 
look at countries where Islam is the minority religion- Peter Riddell at China, Peter 
Sales at the Phillipines- and the development of the religion there. Perhaps one of our 
members who feel a certain competence in this area could do a piece on the Australian 
Islamic scene for our next issue. 
Religion, Politics and Society in Pakistan 
Alan W. Black 
Sociology, UNE 
For a full understanding of the dynam-
ics of the relationship between religion, 
politics and society in Pakistan, one needs 
to look not only at events which have hap-
pened since that nation's inauguration in 
194 7 but also at prior history. It then be-
comes apparent that although the unfold-
ing of events at any particular time has its 
own specific characteristics, there have 
also been recurring patterns. These recur-
ring patterns relate to the significance of 
Islam, as well as of other factors, in social 
and political processes. 
After examining the earlier history of 
Islam on the Indian subcontinent, this pa-
per analyses the part played by religion in 
the movement for the fonnation of Paki-
stan as a separate nation, the place ac-
corded to religion in successive Pakistani 
constitutions, the use made of religion by 
various political leaders and parties, the 
growth of religious fundamentalism, the 
social and political consequences of sec-
tarianism, and the situation of religious 
minorities. 
Islam first reached the Indo-Pakistan 
subcontinent through Arab conquests in 
the Indus Delta in the 8th century C.E. 
However, the major period of Islam's ex-
pansion on the subcontinent dates from 
the 11th century and especially from the 
late 12th century, when many parts of the 
subcontinent came under Muslim hegem-
ony. Through immigration and through 
conversion, especially as a result of the 
preaching of wandering Sufis, Muslims 
steadily increased in number, so that by 
the beginning of the 16th century C.E. 
they constituted a majority of the popula-
tion in what is now Pakistan, even though 
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they always remained a minority in the 
subcontinent as a whole (Schimmel, 
1980; Faruki, 1987). 
The zenith of Muslim rule prior to the 
partition of India came with the estab-
lishment of the Mughal Empire (1526-
1761). Given that the majority of the 
Indian population was non-Muslim, the 
Muslim rulers were faced with a di-
lemma: were they to be impartial rulers of 
a multi-religious community, or was Is-
lam to be accorded primacy, with non-
Muslims being treated merely as 
conquered subjects? Whereas some of his 
Muslim predecessors had enacted laws 
which discriminated against non-Mus-
lims, Emperor Akbar, who ruled from 
1556 to 1605, repealed these enactments. 
His liberal policy was continued by the 
next two Emperors: Jahangir, ruler from 
1605 to 1627, and Shah Jahan, ruler from 
1628 to 1658. Had Shah Jahan been suc-
ceeded by his eldest son, Dara Shikoh, a 
Sufi thinker and writer, it is quite likely 
that a liberal policy would have been 
maintained. However, when Shah Jahan 
became seriously ill in 1657, his four sons 
became involved in a struggle for power, 
which was eventually won by the third 
son, Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb saw himself 
as a champion of orthodox Sunni Islam. 
He persecuted Shi' a and punished heresy, 
blasphemy, slackness in fasting during 
the month of Ramazan and failure to ob-
serve the prescribed five periods of prayer 
daily. To stamp out drinking, gambling 
and sexual immorality, he appointed a 
censor of morals in every large city. He 
also reimposed the jizyah, a poll tax on 
non-Muslims, and made them subject to 
other legal disabilities, thus reversing the 
policy instituted a century earlier by Ak-
bar. In short, Aurangzeb insisted that he 
was the ruler of an Islamic state, rather 
than being simply the Muslim monarch of 
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a multi-religious empire (Schimmel, 
1980; Ahmed, 1986; Srivastava, 1992). 
Although the Mughal empire achieved 
its widest geographical spread during 
Aurangzeb's reign, the severity with 
which he pursued his policies led to wide-
spread discontent and numerous rebel-
lions, which eventually began to sap the 
empire of its strength. Hindu revivalism 
increasingly became an anti-Muslim 
movement. The Sikhs, whose religion 
contained elements drawn from both 
Hindu (Vaishnava) and Islamic (Sufi) 
sources, moved closer to the fanner in 
their ideological and political position and 
engaged in anned struggle against the 
Mughals, as did other ethnic groups such 
as the Pathans and the Marathas. After 
Aurangzeb's death in 1707, these and 
other conflicts, coupled with incompetent 
leadership by his successors, led to the 
collapse of the Mughal empire by the mid-
18th century (Schimmel, 1980). Eventu-
ally British rule, not a Muslim state, was 
established throughout the subcontinent. 
Faced by the less auspicious circum-
stances in which Muslims found them-
selves as a result of the decline of the 
Mughal empire, various Islamic refonn 
movements developed in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Although there 
were differences of emphasis among 
these movements, they all sought the revi-
talisation of Islam. An intellectual pro-
genitor of several of the movements was 
Shah Wali Allah (1703-62), who sought 
to synthesise and systematise the whole 
range of Islamic knowledge, showing 
how apparent conflicts among the sayings 
of the Prophet Muhammad could always 
be reconciled if sayings only of unques-
tioned authenticity were accepted and if 
these sayings were properly understood. 
Shah Wali Allah also translated the 
Qur' an from Arabic into Persian, believ-
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ing that Muslims would be more likely to 
live according to Holy Writ if they could 
understand the text rather than relying 
simply on commentaries. He expounded 
the ideal of a State in which 'ulama (Is-
lamic teachers) would play an important 
role in guiding an enlightened ·Muslim 
ruler, who would appoint officials to en-
force the shari' a (religious law as laid 
down in the Qur' an and Sunnah) and to 
achieve, as far as possible, an Islamic or-
ganisation of society (Schimmel, 1980: 
153-159; Metcalf, 1982: 35-43). 
In the early part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, a less scholarly and more militant Is-
lamic revival movement was led by 
Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1786-1831). He 
and his followers denounced beliefs and 
practices which in any way compromised 
the absolute monotheism of Islam, such 
as the veneration of saints, apostles or · 
martyrs, or the adoption heterodox accre-
tions from Hinduism. The militancy of 
this revivalist movement escalated during 
the 1820s, when Barelvi committed him-
self to jihad (holy war) aimed at over-
throwing the rule of the Sikhs in the 
Punjab. To launch this jihad, he and his 
troops first migrated to the Patllan border-
lands, where they initially won support 
from some of the local tribes. This sup-
port soon eroded when an attempt was 
made to replace the tribal social order 
with a structure similar to that of the first 
Muslim community in Mecca, and espe-
cially when they tried to collect zakat (the 
canonical alms tax) from tribespeople 
who were unaccustomed to any tax at all. 
Although Barel vi succeeded in suppress-
ing this opposition and establishing him-
self in Peshawar in 1830, he and many of 
his followers were killed by the Sikhs in 
the Battle ofBalakot (1831). Some ofhis 
surviving supporters migrated to Mecca 
rather than continuing to live among a 
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people whom they regarded as infidels. 
Others who remained in India converted 
their struggle to one against the British in-
fidels rather than the Sikhs (Schimmel, 
1980: 180-184; Metcalf, 1982: 52-63). 
As the British, whether rightly or 
wrongly, tended to regard Muslims as be-
ing disproportionately, though not solely, 
responsible for the abortive Indian mutiny 
of 1857, restraints imposed upon them in 
the aftennath of the mutiny were particu-
larly severe. In Delhi, for example, the 
mosques were occupied by the British: 
the Jami' Masjid for five years, the 
Fatehpuri Masjid for twenty. Various 
Muslim madrasahs (religious academies) 
were destroyed. In the face of such subjec-
tion, two major reform movements devel-
oped among Muslims in India in the 
following decades. These movements 
were closely associated with two particu-
lar educational institutions: one at Deo-
band, the other at Aligarh (Ahmad, 1967, 
1969; Schimmel, 1980; Metcalf, 1982). 
In 1867, there was established at Deo-
band, near Delhi, a madrasah designed to 
train 'ulama (Islamic teachers) in tradi-
tional Islamic theology and law. The cur-
riculum, originally ten years in length but 
later reduced to six years, was based on a 
study of 106 classical Islamic books. As 
none of these was in English and none 
contained modem scientific perspectives, 
it was unlikely that graduates of the acad-
emy would find employment in govern-
ment service. They were destined, rather, 
to become prayer leaders, writers, preach-
ers and teachers within the Muslim com-
munity. The academy at Deoband, and 
others modelled on it, was thus dedicated 
to the maintenance of traditional Islamic 
orthodoxy, making no concessions to 
. Western culture (Schimmel, 1980:209-
211; Metcalf, 1982). 
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A different approach was adopted by 
Muslim modernists, who incorporated cer-
tain Western values, especially contempo-
rary scientific perspectives, into their 
world-view.ln 1875, largely as a result of 
the efforts ofSayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-
1898), the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental 
College was founded at Aligarh, classes 
beginning in 1878. There, in contrast to 
Deoband, the predominant medium of in-
struction was English and students im-
bibed liberal ideals and a scientific 
outlook. Muslim civil servants, landed 
gentry and princely rulers gave enthusias-
tic support to the college, hoping that its 
combination of English education and Is-
lamic values would help Muslims in India 
to regain some of the power and prestige 
they had lost since the decline of the 
Mughal empire. Of the four hundred or so 
graduates of the college in the nineteenth 
century, about two-thirds entered the civil 
service (Metcalf, 1982). 
In short, the educational institutions at 
Deoband and Aligarh represented ·and re-
inforced two rather different perspectives 
among Muslims in India in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries: the one tradition-
alist and dominated by 'ulama (Islamic 
teachers), the other modernist and led by 
educated laypersons (the Muslim 
salariat). Although the leaders of the 
movement which eventually led to the for-
mation of Pakistan were drawn largely 
from the latter group, this should not be 
interpreted to mean that antipathy to Brit-
ish colonialism developed earlier among 
the latter group than among the former. 
Prior to British rule, the Muslim 'ulama 
and Hindu pandits (priests) held lucrative 
and influential positions in the judicial 
system and the educational system in In-
dia. With the transplantation of British le-
gal and educational institutions to that 
country, the traditional religious leaders 
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lost ground to a new class of judges, law-
yers and teachers trained in British ways. 
Resenting their loss of status and income, 
the 'ulama found common cause with 
those Hindus who wished to see an end to 
British rule. By contrast, Muslim mem-
bers of the new class which had pros-
pered under British rule were wary of any 
attempt to overthrow that regime, fearing 
that their position in society would be 
threatened by the Hindu majority which 
would then be in control of the govern-
ment and the civil service (Alavi, 1986). 
As movements to institute a more 
democratic political system developed in 
India in the twentieth century, there was 
an increasing awareness among Muslims 
that the only way in which they could 
avoid being subjugated to the Hindu ma-
jority was by some fonn of political sepa-
ration between Hindus and Muslims. The 
Muslim League, founded in 1906, in-
itially sought the creation of separate Mus-
lim electorates, a right that was granted in 
1909. Although, in an address to the All 
India Muslim League in 1930, the philoso-
pher and poet Muhammad Iqbal pre-
sented a vision of·a self-governing nation · 
in the predominantly Muslim provinces 
which now make up Pakistan, it was not 
until 1940 that Muhammad Ali Jinnah 
persuaded the Muslim League to adopt 
this particular political goal, which by 
then had been enlarged to include also the 
area which later became Bangladesh. 
Given the importance of Iqbal and Jin-
nah in the movement which ultimately led 
to the fonnation of Pakistan, it is useful to 
examine their views on the relationship 
between religion, politics and society. In 
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought 
in Islam, based on lectures he gave in 
1928-29, Iqbal argued for the concept of 
ijtihad, the right to go back to the founda-
tion of jurisprudence and not necessarily · 
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to adhere to the conclusions reached by 
one of the traditional Islamic legal 
schools. Sunnis considered ijtihad pennis-
sible only on points not already decided 
by recognised authorities; on points al-
ready decided, they demanded taqlid 
(strict confonnity to tradition). In Iqbal's 
view, this had resulted in the ossification 
of Islamic law, preventing its adaption to 
new social and political situations. 
Whereas traditionalists had stressed that 
ijma' (consensus) among religious schol-
ars was required for ijtihad, Iqbal gave a 
more radical and more political intexpreta-
tion of ijma' using it to refer to a consen-
sus reached through a parliamentary 
legislative system in a Muslim state (Ah-
mad, 1967; Schimmel, 1980: 266; Met-
calf, 1982: 363). 
Like Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, re-
vered by Pakistanis as the Quaid-i-Azam 
(Great Leader) and founder of Pakistan, 
was a Western-educated Muslim modern-
ist. There is considerable controversy 
among later commentators as to the pre-
cise role Jinnah envisaged for Islam in the 
new nation. Writers such as Sharif al Mu-
jahid (1981) argue that Jinnah had in 
mind what was latter called an 'Islamic 
. State' even though he might not have 
used this particular tenn. Other writers, 
such as Munir (1980) and Alavi (1988), 
present evidence which indicates that Jin-
nah had in mind not a theocracy but a 
secular democratic state, one in which the 
essential principles of Islam could be 
freely maintained but where there would 
also be full freedom of religion. Although 
religion was to play a central role in deter-
mining which parts of India would be 
hived off to fonn Pakistan, there was 
among Islamic traditionalists, such as the 
Deobandi 'ulama, and among Islamic fun-
damentalists, such as members of the 
Jama'at-i-Islami, strong opposition to the 
Pakistan movement as embodied in Jin-
nah and the Muslim League. The core of 
the Pakistan movement's support came 
from the Muslim salariat, whose modern-
ist leanings were anathema to the tradi-
tionalists and the fundamentalists. It was 
only on the eve of partition or afterwards 
that many members of these latter two 
groups were willing to throw in their lot 
with the new nation (Alavi, 1988). Pre-
sumably they then hoped that their vision 
of the proper relationship between Islam 
and the State would eventually, if not im-
mediately, be fulfilled in Pakistan. 
5 
Given the history which, has been out-
lined above, it was inevitable that there 
would be differences of opinion within 
Pakistan as to the new country's Constitu-
tion. The concept of an Islamic State as 
envisaged by the conservative 'ulama, 
which would have meant unflinching ap-
plication of the shari' a (Islamic law) and 
fonnal empowennent of religious schol-
ars to veto any legislation not in confonn-
ity with Islamic teaching,. was 
unacceptable to the Western-educated, 
Western-orientated modernists. The Ob-
jectives Resolution adopted by the Con-
stituent Assembly in March 1949 
attempted an accommodation between re-
ligious conservatives and modernists. The 
Resolution began with the declaration that 
'sovereignty over the entire universe be-
longs to God Almighty alone, and the 
authority which He has delegated to the 
State of Pakistan through its people for be-
ing exercised within the limits prescribed 
by Him is a sacred trust'. The Resolution 
spoke of Pakistan as a sovereign inde-
pendent State 
Wherein the principles of democracy,free-
dom, equality, tolerance and social justice as 
enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed; 
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Wherein the Muslims of Pakistan shall be en-
abled individually and collectively to order 
their lives in accord with the teachings andre-
quirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy 
Qur' an and the Sunnah; 
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for 
the minorities freely to profess and practise 
their religions and develop their cultures ... 
(quoted in Choudhury, 1969: 35) 
Because the Resolution's references to 
Islam were capable of either a fundamen-
talist or a more liberal reading, they 
masked rather than resolved the deep divi-
sions of opinion as to the place religion 
should occupy in Pakistani polity. 
With some modifications, the 1949 
Objectives Resolution was incorporated 
into the preamble to the Constitutions of 
Pakistan adopted successively in 1956, 
1962 and 1973. The 1956 Constitution 
specified that the name of the State was 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and that 
the Head of State must be a Muslim. At 
the same time, in_ a Part dealing with Fun-
damental Rights, the Constitution stated 
(section 18) that 
Subject to law, public order and morality -
(a) every citizen has the right to profess, p rae-
lise and propagate any religion; and 
(b) every religious denomination and every 
sect thereof has the right to establish, main-
tain and manage its religious institutions. 
In Section 22, the Constitution also 
guaranteed the right to move the Supreme 
Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of these Fundamental Rights. 
Under the heading 'Directive Princi-
ples of State Policy' the Constitution 
stipulated (Section 25) that the State shall 
endeavour, as regards the Muslims of 
Pakistan -@QUOTE= (a) to provide fa-
cilities whereby they may be enabled to 
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understand the meaning of life according 
to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah; 
(b) to make the teaching of the Holy 
Qur'an compulsory; 
(c) to promote unity and the observance 
of Islamic moral standards; 
(d) to secure the proper organisation of 
zakat, wakfs and mosques. 
However, it was specifically stated 
(Section 23) that these particular provi-
sions were not enforceable in any court. 
The 1956 Constitution also stipulated 
(Section 198) that no law should be en-
acted that was repugnant to the injunc-
tions of Islam as laid down in the Holy 
Qur'an and Sunnah and that existing law 
should be brought into conformity with 
such injunctions. A Commission was to 
be established to make recommendations 
to the National Assembly (Parliament) on 
these particular issues. 
The Constitution of 1956 remained in 
force for only about two and a half years, 
being abrogated in October 1958, when 
President lskander Mirza declared martial 
law and appointed the army commander-
in-chief, General Muhammad Ayub 
Khan, the Chief Martial Law Administra-
tor. About three weeks later, Ayub Khan 
deposed Mirza and declared himself Presi-
dent. As well as being the beginning of a 
long period of military rule in Pakistan, 
Ayub Khan's accession to power was re-
garded by religious traditionalists and fun-
damentalists as a major reversal of 
Pakistan's progress toward becoming a 
truly Islamic State. His main priority was 
to build a 'modem, progressive, united 
and strong Pakistan' (quoted in Ahmad, 
1991; 472). Although he regarded Islam 
in its original form as being a 'dynamic 
and progressive movement', he felt that in 
its more dogmatic forms Islam had failed 
to keep pace with developments in mod-
em science and philosophy.(quoted in 
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Munir 1980: 89; see also Ayub Khan, 
1967: 195-204). In this respect, he be-
longed to the ranks of the Muslim mod-
ernists. He introduced humane refonns to 
Muslim family laws (e.g. laws on polyg-
amy, divorce, and maintenance provisions 
for women), thereby incurring the wrath 
of Islamic traditionalists and fundamental-
ists. Under his regime, the government 
took over the administration of major re-
ligious endowments that had previously 
been controlled by hereditary custodians 
(Ahmad, 1991: 472).·Despite his modern-
ist predisposition, Ayub Khan believed 
that parliamentary democracy of the West-
minster style had proved unworkable in 
Pakistan, and that it must be replaced by a 
different system. 
As well as legitimising the role of a 
powerful President and providing for a 
system of 'Basic Democracies' whereby 
members of the National Assembly 
would be elected, the second Constitu-
tion, promulgated by Ayub Khan in 1962, 
gave the name of the country as the Re-
public of Pakistan, not the Islamic Repub-
lic of Pakistan. The Constitution 
nevertheless specified that the President 
shall be a Muslim. Under the heading 
'Principles of Law-Making', it stated that 
'no law should be repugnant to Islam' 
and that no law should 'prevent the mem-
bers of a religious community or denomi-
nation from professing, practising or 
propagating, or from providing instruc-
tion in their religion, or from conducting 
institutions for the purposes of or in con-
nection with their religion' (reproduced in 
Schuler and Schuler, 1967: 266, 268). 
While stipulating that it was the responsi-
bility of each legislature to ensure that 
proposed laws did not violate these Princi-
ples, the 1962 Constitution also stated 
that the validity of a law shall not be 
called into question on such grounds. 
Hence, resort to the courts to enforce the 
right to freedom of religion (and other 
Fundamental Rights specified in the 1956 
Constitution) was not provided for. 
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Whereas the Directive Principles in 
the 1956 Constitution (Section 25) stated 
that 'steps shall be taken to enable the 
Muslims of Pakistan individually and col-
lectively to order their lives in accordance 
with the Holy Qur' an and Sunnah', the 
Principles of Policy in the 1962 Constitu-
tion spoke simply of enabling Muslims to 
order their lives 'in accordance with the 
fundamental principles and basic con-
cepts of Islam' (reproduced in Schuler 
and Schuler, 1967: 271). Religious tradi-
tionalists and fundamentalists regarded 
the new wording as insufficiently spe-
cific. They noted, too, that unlike its 
predecessor, the 1962 Constitution did 
not specify that existing law should be 
brought into confonnity with the injunc-
tions of Islam as laid down in the Holy 
Qur' an and Sunnah. 
There was considerable public criti-
cism of various aspects of the 1962 Con-
stitution, especially of its failure to 
provide legal guarantees of fundamental 
rights. Religious traditionalists also clam-
oured for a restoration of those Islamic 
features of the 1956 Constitution which 
had been omitted. A private Bill was intro-
duced into the reconstituted, but scarcely 
democratic, National Assembly, seeking 
to amend the New Constitution accord-
ingly. Although he would have preferred 
not to make such changes, President 
Ayub knew it was not long before he 
would need to face a Presidential election. 
Rather than resist the proposed amend-
ments, he judged it more politic to accept 
them. Passed by the National Assembly 
in December 1963, and receiving Presi-
dential assent in January 1964, the first 
amending Act changed Part II, Chapter 1, 
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of the 1962 Constitution from 'Principles 
of Law-Making' to 'Fundamental 
Rights', these rights becoming enforce-
able at law. Also as a result of this amend-
ing Act, the country's name again became 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 
other Islamic features of the 1956 Consti-
tution were substantially restored (Choud-
hury, 1969: 184; Feldman, 1972: 25-27). 
Despite his own modernist learning, 
President Ayub was not averse to making 
use of conservative interpretations of Is-
lam when it suited him. In the 1965 Presi-
dential election, when the opposition 
candidate was Miss Fatima Jinnah (sister 
of M.A. Jinnah), he succeeded in getting 
afatwa (religious decree) from a gather-
ing of conservative 1Ulama that under Is-
lamic law a woman could not be head of 
state. 
The 1962 Constitution, with various 
amendments, remained in force until 25 
March 1969, when widespread protests fo-
cusing on issues of socioeconomic jus-
tice, political participation and regional 
autonomy led to Ayub Khan's resignation 
as President and a reimposition of martial 
law under General Yahya Khan (Feld-
man, 1972; Choudhury, 1974: 1-45). Al-
though opposition frorn Islamic 
traditionalists and fundamentalists prob-
ably contributed, at least indirectly, to the 
end of the Ayub regime, this was a much 
less important factor than the more mun-
dane considerations mentioned in the pre-
vious sentence. Indeed, in ·the later stages 
of the anti-Ayub agitation, the Jama'at-i-
Islami, a bastion of Islamic fundamental-
ism, was so alanned at the rise of secular, 
socialist and regional political forces that 
it swung in favour of the existing power 
structures, which paid at least lip service 
to Islam (Jalal, 1990: 307-308: Ahmad, 
1991: 474). 
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After a period of martial law under Ya-
hya Khan, general elections for a civilian 
government were held in December 1970. 
Despite its high hopes, the Jama'at-i-Is-
lami fared poorly, winning only four of 
the 300 general seats in the National As-
sembly. Under the slogan roti, kapra aur 
makan (bread, clothing and shelter), Z.A. 
Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) 
won 81 of the 138 seats in West Pakistan. 
Sheikh Mujib's Awami League, on a plat-
fonn of maximum provincial autonomy, 
won all but two of the 162 seats in East 
Pakistan, giving it an overall majority in 
the Assembly. The prospect of a govern-
ment dominated by Bengalis was unthink-
able to the Punjabi-dominated military 
and civil service. After some futile at-
tempts at compromise, General Y ahya 
suspended the Assembly. East Pakistan 
went on a general strike and later declared 
itself the independent nation of Bangla-
desh, being aided in this process by the in-
tervention of the Indian anny 
(Choudhury, 1974; Feldman 1975; Jalal, 
1990: 309-311). 
The Pakistan anny's failure to prevent 
the secession of East Pakistan marked the 
end ofYahya Khan's regime in what re-
mained of Pakistan. After Z. A. Bhutto 
succeeded him as President, an all-party 
committee began work on a new Constitu-
tion. Islamic traditionalists and fundamen-
talists, including the four members of the 
Jama'at-i-Islami who were members of 
the National Assembly, demanded that 
the Constitution embody the requirements 
of the shari' a. Parliamentarians from the 
North West Frontier Province and 
Baluchistan contended that the Constitu-
tion should include Qur' anic punishments 
and should prohibit the taking of interest, 
the consumption of alcohol and the prac-
tice of any fonn of gambling. Some 
wished to have it made compulsory for 
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women to wear the chador (veil) 
(Zakaria, 1988: 233). 
The Constitution finally adopted in 
1973 was said to be 'the most Islamic con-
stitution in the history of Pakistan' (Ah-
mad, 1991: 477). In essence, all of the 
Islamic provisions from the 1956 Consti-
tution w~re adopted, and further provi-
sions were added, although some 
particular suggestions, such as requiring 
women to wear the chador, were not 
adopted. In the 1973 Constitution, Islam 
was, for the first time, declared to be the 
State religion. Although Urdu was desig-
nated as the national language, the Consti-
tution also specified that the State would 
encourage and facilitate the learning of 
Arabic, the language of the Qur'an. Not-
withstanding the primacy accorded to Is-
lam, the fundamental rights defined and 
made justiciable under the Constitution in-
cluded the right of every citizen, subject 
to law, order and public morality, to pro-
fess, practice and propagate his or her re-
ligion. This right was, however, 
subsequently whittled away by amend-
ments to the Constitution. 
Although, or perhaps because, Bhutto 
used the tenn 'Islamic socialism' to de-
scribe his policies, he was not generally 
viewed with favour by Islamic traditional-
ists and fundamentalists. He himself ex-
pressed the view that 'secularism, in the 
sense of tolerance and the rejection of the-
ocracy, is inherent in Islamic political cul-
ture' (Bhutto, 1973: 11). Money flowing 
from OPEC countries to Islamic groups in 
Pakistan as a result of the oil boom of the 
mid-1970s gave a boost to Bhutto's relig-
ious opponents. These opponents' allega-
tions that his policies were un-Islamic 
found a sympathetic hearing among the 
urban middle classes, who had benefited 
little from his policies, and among indus-
trialists, big businessmen and especially 
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small-scale entrepreneurs, who perceived 
his labour laws, nationalisation program 
and other socialistic leanings as threats to 
their economic interests. In 1974, in a 
cynical attempt to placate his religious 
critics, Bhutto had the Constitution 
amended so as to declare the Ahmadi sect 
to be non-Muslim. In his last few months 
in office, he made further concessions to 
the religious parties, introducing prohibi-
tions on alcohol, gambling and night 
clubs, and declaring Friday rather than 
Sunday as the weekly holiday. This, how-
ever, did not satisfy his religious critics. 
In the March 1977 elections, Bhutto's 
Pakistan People's Party was opposed by 
the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a 
hastily constructed nine-party coalition, 
comprising two traditional 1Ulama parties, 
the fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islami, and 
six other non-clerical parties. When 
Bhutto won the election with 80 per cent 
of the seats, the PNA accused him of rig-
ging the results. The widespread public 
disturbances which followed led Bhutto 
to declare martial law in the cities of La-
hore, Karachi and Hyderabad. He un-
wisely ordered troops to fire on PNA 
supporters coming out of mosques, an or-
der the army was reluctant to follow. 
Eventually, on 4 July 1977, in an opera-
tion code-named 'Fairplay', the army 
placed Bhutto and other PPP leaders un-
der house arrest. The anny chief, General 
Zia-ul-Haq, declared himself Chief Mar-
tial Law Administrator, promising to hold 
an election within ninety days, but he 
kept postponing this on various pretexts. 
Military rule under Zia continued under 
1985, when there was a partial restoration 
of civilian rule, although Zia remained as 
President (Jalal, 1990: Lamb, 1991). 
In contrast to Bhutto, whose Sufi sym-
pathies and penchant for whisky were 
well known, Zia was a much more puri-
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tanical and orthodox Sunni. Despite the 
non-democratic foundation of his regime, 
Zia 's accession to power was hailed by Is-
lamic traditionalists and fundamentalists, 
who saw in him their best chance yet to 
achieve in Pakistan a truly Islamic State. 
Zia, in tum, sought legitimacy for his re-
gime by embarking on a programme of Is-
lamization. A book entitled Pakistan: 
Return from the Precipice 1977-1979, 
with an introductory chapter written by re-
tired Major-General Shahid Hamid, re-
viewed the main achievements of the first 
two years of Zia's rule. Under the head-
ing 'Religious Affairs', particular atten-
tion was. given to a series of laws enacted 
in 1979, based on the injunctions of Is-
lam. These provided for the introduction 
of two Islamic taxes- zakat (an alms tax) 
and 'ushr (another welfare tax based on 
the value of agricultural production) - and 
the adoption of the harsh penalties pre-
scribed in the shari' a for theft, adultery, 
fornication, making false accusations of 
sexual. misconduct, or consuming into xi-
cants. In practice, these penalties, which 
included flogging (for variOl;IS offences), 
amputation of the right hand or the left 
foot (for theft of property worth more 
than 4.457 grams of gold) and stoning to 
death (for adultery with a married person) 
were rarely if ever imposed, the judiciary 
being unwilling to do so when the law of 
evidence had not been Islamicized. This 
outcome was a profound disappointment 
to those Islamic traditionalists and funda-
mentalists who had greeted Zia' s coming 
to power (Weiss, 1986; Faruki, 1987; Ah-
mad, 1991). 
Zia proceeded cautiously with the Is-
lamization of the financial sector. Here, 
the main objective was the elimination of 
riba (interest). From the time of the 1956 
Constitution onwards, the achievement of 
this objective 'as early as possible' had 
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been stated as a directive principle in 
State policy but little had been done to ac-
complish this. In September 1977, Zia re-
quested the Council of Islamic Ideology 
(CII) to prepare a report on 'the Elimina-
tion of Interest from the Economy'. In 
May 1980, when the CII was almost 
ready to submit its report, a Committee 
on Islamization, appointed by the Minis-
ter of Finance in April 1980, published its 
Agenda on Islamic Economic Reform. 
The latter report recommended a very 
gradual process of implementing an Is-
lamic economic order and cautioned 
against an undue or exclusive emphasis 
on zakat and on the elimination of inter-
est. Indeed, the report noted (p.iv) that the 
latter might lead to a decidedly un-Is-
lamic outcome: a 'rise in the economic ex-
ploitation of the poor by the rich'. The 
Zia government heeded the Committee's 
warning against abrupt changes to the eco-
nomic system. In a series of steps, it intro-
duced so-called interest-free banking, but 
in reality this was little more than a 
sleight of hand: what was once called 'in-
terest' was now called 'mark up' or 're-
turn' (Burki, 1986; Gieraths, 1991). 
The Ahmadi religious minority fared 
badly under Zia. They had already been 
officially declared non-Muslim by consti-
tutional amendments introduced by Z. A. 
Bhutto. In 1984, Zia issued an ordinance 
making it a criminal offence for them to 
use Islamic terminology, to use the Is-
lamic call to prayer, to call their places of 
worship mosques, to propagate their relig-
ion or to engage in any conduct that 'out-
rages' a Muslim (Mayer, 1993). Criminal 
prosecutions of Ahmadis (also known as 
Qadianis) followed, as did attacks on 
them and their property. In a message to a 
conference in London in 1985, Zia prom-
ised to 'persevere in our efforts to ensure 
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the cancer of Qadianism is exterminated' 
(quoted in Lamb, 1991: 273). 
Reform of educational institutions was 
another aspect of Zia 's Islamization pro-
gram. He directed that textbooks and cur-
ricula should be revised so as to conform 
to Islamic values, with religious educa-
tion made compulsory for Muslims. He 
gave a boost to the work of the traditional 
schools of Islamic education (deeni 
madaris), the number of which increased 
greatly in the early 1980s. Following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Decem-
ber 1979, many of the deeni madaris in 
the North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) received large numbers of Af-
ghan students and became at least indi-
rectly involved in the jihad against the 
Soviets and the Soviet-backed regime in 
Kabul. Because they were seen as bul-
warks against the spread of communism, 
these madaris received fmancial support 
from both at home and abroad. The move-
ment of men and money into the NWFP 
was accompanied by a movement of arms 
and drugs. Thus emerged the 'kalash-
nikov culture' which is still a problem in 
various parts of Pakistan today. In particu-
lar, the stimulus and support given by the 
Zia government and by overseas support-
ers to the deeni madaris run by rival, mili-
tant Islamic groups paved the way for the 
violent sectarianism that has erupted in 
Karachi and elsewhere in recent years. 
Long-standing ethnic divisions and eco-
nomic grievances provide additional ele-
ments in this explosive mix. 
Overall, Zia' s Islamization program 
probably served his immediate interests 
more than it did the objectives of the Is-
lamic traditionalists and fundamentalists. 
Although these latter groups made some 
gains, the achievements fell well short of 
their hopes. Zia 's claim that the process 
of Islamization was not yet complete pro-
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vided a convenient reason for delaying a 
return to fully democratic government. 
One can only speculate as to what might 
have happened if he had not been killed, 
along with several other high ranking mili-
tary officers and the U.S. Ambassador to 
Pakistan, in a mysterious plane crash in 
August 1988. In May of that year he had 
abruptly dissolved the National Assembly 
(which had been revived in 1985) and dis-
missed his own government, claiming 
that the Islamization process had lost mo-
mentum and needed to be given fresh im-
petus. In June he issued the Enforcement 
of Shari' a Ordinance which stated that the 
· Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the 
Qur' an and the Sunnah shall be the su-
preme source of law in Pakistan and that 
laws found to be inconsistent with these 
Injunctions shall be nullified (see the full 
text in Choudhury, 1988: 245-249). The 
Ordinance provided, inter alia, for the ap-
pointment of experienced and well quali-
fled 'ulama as judges in courts 
subordinate to the High Court. This was a 
significant concession toward what the Is-
lamic traditionalists had long been de-
manding - bringing the whole legal 
system under clerical control and making 
all laws, including the Constitution, subor-
dinate to the shari' a, as had been done in 
Iran. Mayer (1993) speculates that Zia 
may have planned to use this ordinance as 
a way of disqualifying Benazir Bhutto 
from becoming Prime Minister, since it 
could be argued that this would contra-
vene the shari' a. Having not been for-
mally ratified before his death, the 
ordinance lapsed. 
In the national elections held in No-
vember 1988, the Pakistan People's 
Party, led by Benazir Bhutto and running 
on an explicitly secular platform, won 93 
out of the 205 Muslim seats. The next 
largest voting bloc, with 54 seats, was the 
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Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), a 
loose coalition of nine parties committed 
to a continuation of Zia 's Islamization 
policies. Most of the remaining seats 
were won by independents. Thus Benazir 
Bhutto became the first woman to be 
elected as leader of a Muslim country. 
Whilst the electoral trouncing given to the 
IDA can be interpreted as one indication 
of the relatively limited popularity of 
Zia's policies, it was no guarantee that the 
PPP under Benazir Bhutto would be able 
to deal effectively with the many prob-
lems facing Pakistan. Distrusted by both 
the President and the military, opposed by 
a non-PPP government in the numerically · 
and economically dominant Punjab prov-
ince, and surrounded by ministers who 
were as much interested in enjoying the 
spoils of office as in grappling with the 
country's problems, her wings were 
clipped. Problems of inflation and of law 
and order were rampant. She was unable 
to reverse the process of Islamization, of 
which she had previously been so critical. 
After only 20 months, the President dis-
solved the National Assembly and dis-
missed her government from office, 
allegedly for corruption, mismanagement 
and violation of the Constitution. 
In the elections held two months later, 
the PPP won only 45 seats as against the 
105 won by the IDA. Punjabi industrialist 
Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister 
with the backing of the army and the civil 
service. Although he had been an associ-
ate of Zia and although segments of the 
IDA were strong advocates of Islamiza-
tion, Nawaz Sharif was more a pragmatist 
than an Islamic ideologist. This was cer-
tainly the image he projected when trying 
to attract investment in Pakistan from 
Western countries and also when introduc-
ing into Parliament a Bill which led to the 
Enforcement of Shari' a Act 1991. While 
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many of the provisions contained in this 
legislation were similar to what had been 
pursued under Zia - such as Islamization 
of education and the economy, promotion 
of Islamic values in the media, and the 
eradication of obscenity, immorality and 
vice -they did not go as far as was 
hoped by the religious parties. It has been 
argued that Nawaz Sharif introduced this 
legislation in order to forestall a proposed 
private Bill which would have gone much 
further in entrenching the shari' a as the 
supreme law in Pakistan (Mayer, 1993). 
After his government was involved in 
a series of legal and constitutional wran-
gles, the military was heavily implicated 
in Nawaz Sharif's enforced resignation 
from the office of Prime Minister in mid-
1993 and in Benazir Bhutto 's re-elevation 
to that office following elections a few 
months later. Since then, the process of Is-
lamization has neither moved forward nor 
been very significantly rolled back. 
One continuing legacy of the Zia re-
gime is the law on blasphemy. This law 
originally prescribed either the death pen-
alty or life imprisonment for anyone 
found guilty of blasphemy. Subsequently 
the Federal Shariat Court ruled that under 
Islamic law the death penalty is manda-
tory in such cases. On the flimsiest of evi-
dence, two Christians (one aged 14) were 
convicted in February 1995 of defiling 
the name of the Prophet Muhammad and 
were sentenced to death. On appeal, this 
conviction was overturned by the Lahore 
High Court. Whilst the result of the ap-
peal was welcomed by the Bhutto govern-
ment and by advocates of human rights, it 
was protested by some Islamic militants, 
who threatened to take the law into their 
own hands if they had a chance to do so. 
A third person accused of the blasphemy, 
but equally innocent, had been murdered 
prior to the trial. 
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In conclusion one can say that al-
though over 90 per cent of the Pakistani 
population professes Islam, there are 
quite diverse views as to what Islam re-
ally is. Sufism was a major force in the 
spread of Islam on the Indo-Pakistan sub-
continent and this stream of influence is 
still evident in folk Islam with its saints 
and shrines. This fonn of Islam is gener-
ally viewed with disdain by those who 
claim to follow a purist tradition based on 
Scripture (the Qur'an) and Islamic juris-
prudence (shari' a). These Islamic tradi-
tionalists or fundamentalists are in tum 
regarded by Islamic modernists as out of 
touch with modem scholarship and con-
temporary realities. 
Since Pakistan's inception as a sepa-
rate nation, more political power has been 
wielded by the anny and the civil service 
than by religious elites, but from time to 
time Islamic traditionalists or fundamen-
talists have helped to shape the political 
agenda, especially when governments 
have wished to assert or bolster the Is-
lamic credentials of their particular re-
gime. The most notable inStance of this 
was during the Zia era, when a much 
vaunted program of Islamization was un-
dertaken with mixed results. Division of 
opinion is likely to continue over the im-
plications of Islam for public policy in 
Pakistan. 
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A study of some beliefs of mystical groups within 
the Muslim Community of Bangladesh. 
Morris A Lee 
Introduction 
The modem day republic of Bangla-
desh came into being some twenty five 
years ago, rising out of the ashes of a 
failed experiment in religious unity, 
namely East and West Pakistan. East Paki-
stan became Bangladesh in 1971. 
The peoples of this area have a long 
and complex religious history. Many 
scholars have noted that the people of the 
Greater Plain of Bengal had a peculiar 
and distinctive culture from that of the 
Aryan Hindus. Before its submergence 
under Brahmanical domination, this area 
was the seat of a civilisation different in 
significant respects from that of the vedic 
Aryan1. Buddhism and Jainism had their 
origin in the area east of the middle 
Gangetic plain which was the orthodox 
centre of Brahmanical culture. The above 
two systems emphasised the primacy of 
human spirit in contrast to vedic theol-
ogy2. Dr. Ahmed Sharif, in commenting 
on the philosophical and religious back-
ground of greater Bengal, has written: 
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Shankya, Yoga and Tantra are the ancient lo-
cal beliefs and writings. Shankya is the phi-
losophy whereas Yl?fa and Tantra are sacred 
ritual and practice. 
Some scholars have called Tantra Ben-
gal's original religion. S. B. Das Gupta de-
scribes Tantra in Bengal as the 'original 
non Aryan cult belief~ and Samaren 
Roy5 insists that the key to the history 
and culture of Bengal lies hidden in Tan-
tra. Dr. Ahmed Sharif maintains that de-
, spite the coming of the Jain and Buddhist 
religious systems, Shankya thought and 
Yogic and Tantric practice strengthened. 
Their later inclusion in Brahmanical writ-
ings also did not prevent their continu-
ation in undiluted fonn6. Samaren Roy 
comments 7: . 
Brahmanism, as we know it today, was the 
last to enter the religious scene in Bengal; 
and even when it did, it generally remained as 
a sort of super-religion dominating the outer 
forms, but beneath its surface the original 
faiths and practices of the land remained 
dominant. 
The Advent of Islam 
Though Bengal had begun to feel the 
influence of Islam from the lOth century 
(and possibly earlier) through Arab trad-
ers and merchants, the real impact of Is-
lam came in the wake of the Turkish 
conquest towards the beginning of the 
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13th century8• Because of the change in 
political control with the independent Sul-
tans and later the Mughals(from the 16th 
century), a new framework was provided 
for the dissemination of Islam in the re-
gion. The new Muslim rulers replaced the 
Hindu kings, allowed migration of Mus-
lims from the west ( eg. Turks, Persians, 
Arabs, North Indians) and allowed the 
mystics of Islam, the sufis, to propagate 
Islam amongst the masses of the people. 
Though over the years there has been 
some debate about the origins of the large 
masses of Muslim converts in Bengal9, 
most historical and anthropological stud-
ies agree that by far the major proportion 
of the Muslim community in Bengal 
came through conversion from other relig-
ious communities rather than through mi-
gration from outside. Salahuddin Ahmed 
. 10 
wntes , 
Although a considerable number of Muslim 
immigrants had come to Bengal at different 
times and from different parts of the Islamic 
world during about six centuries of Muslim 
rule, the bulk of the Muslim population of Ben"" 
gal were of indigenous origin being converted 
from the Hindu and Buddhist elements. 
Hardy11 ,quoting the 'Report on the 
Census ofBengal1901 ',says that per-
haps one-sixth of the population of the 
Presidency of Bengal at that time could 
lay claim to some foreign blood in their 
veins. 
Role of the Sufis 
Muslim saints or sufis took their mes-
sage to the cultivators and rural people of 
Bengal in areas where Brahmanism had 
not succeeded in gaining dominance. The 
influence of these sufi 's (or pir' sas they 
were and are more popularly known by 
the rural people living in the area occu-
pied mostly now by present day. Bangla-
desh) was the major factor in the ultimate 
conversion or change of religious and so-
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cial allegiance of the majority of the popu-
lation. But such a change, rather than an 
immediate, complete philosophical and 
theological tum-around, was probably a 
slow gradual process. Ashim Roy12, in 
discussing the development of Muslim tra- · 
dition in Bengal, postulates three stages 
namely: 
(1) a mass movement of people to Is-
lam with conversion probably being 
largely a 'change offellowship'13 or com;. 
munity. 
(2) a syncretism of the endogenous tra-
ditions of the converted masses with the 
exogenous tradition of Islam to overcome 
the dichotomy between the two. 
and (3) a striving for a deeper Islamic 
consciousness beginning in the early part 
of the nineteenth century with the rise of 
various fundamentalist and revivalist Is-
lamic movements with the result that 
there have been various degrees of attack 
on the syncretistic and acculturated tradi-
tion postulated in stage (2) above. 
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The very nature of the sufi movement 
within Islam was such that it displayed an 
openness and tolerance to include 'out-
side practices' and ideas14. Haque15 
claims that the sufi' s who came to Bengal 
were those of North India and had already 
absorbed aspects of Indian thought and · 
· practice. In Bengal, local beliefs and prac-
tices were assimilated with exogenous ls-
lam16. Haque17 makes the comment that 
associated with the preaching and spread 
of Islam in Bengal, the Indian methods of 
Shahajiya and Yoga overwhelmed Sufi 
beliefs. Gradually Sufi beliefs and rituals 
were syncretised with Yoga and other ritu-
als of Hinduism. The writings of the Mus-
lilns of Bengal, particularly·those that 
have survived or have been passed on 
from the era when Islam was becoming 
established in the hearts of the rural peo-
ple, bear adequate testimony to the inter-
mingling of exogenous and endogenous 
religious traditions 18. 
Recent Islamic Ferment 
The last two hundred years have seen 
various movements to encourage grea~er 
conformity to the ideals of Islam as inter-
preted by the leaders of these various 
movements. These movements seem to 
have had little long term effect in wean-
ing the population away from practices 
which were deeply ingrained into the lo-
cal Muslim religious consciousness but 
not really findin~ orthodox approval eg. 
devotion to a pir 9. 
During the Pakistan period constant 
pressure was exerted on the people of 
East Pakistan under the guise of national 
and religious unity to forsake their lan-
guage and culture. This pressure effec-
tively amounted to cultural and economic 
imperialism20. Commenting on the emer-
gence of Bangladesh as a nation-state in 
1971, Salahuddin Ahmed has written21, 
.... the entire historical perspective of the sub-
continent has undergone a change. The rise of 
the new Bengali nationalism cutting across 
(the) religious barrier has added a new dimen-
sion to [the] social and political reality . ..... 
People living within the geographical limits 
of the present state of Bangladesh were 
aroused by a new and unprecedented patri-
otic feeling, apurelysecular sentiment. Love 
for the -land and love for the people who in-
habit this land, and lovefor the language and 
culture of the people of this land~ 
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Rural Bangladesh is a face to face soci-
ety in which people are mainly con-
cerned with survival in a hostile 
environment. There is little interest in ab-
stract, metaphysical, formalised doctrines 
but in common with many other folk so-
cieties, the religious-cultural world is 
dominated by an instinctive search for a 
deeper reality beyond, but also within, the 
everyday. Ashim Ray in his study of the 
syncretistic tradition of Bengal shows that 
there is evidence in the folk literature of a 
search for divinity, religiosity, and godli-
ness in the supernatural and fantastic22. 
Studies such as those done by C. Ma-
loney, K. M. Ashraful Aziz and P. C. 
Sarker23 and T. Blanchet24 show that an-
cient beliefs have persisted strongly in the 
everyday lives of people. Common and 
widespread examples of such ancient be-
liefs and associated practices are devo-
tion to a pir, the saint or holy man; 
visitation of the mazar , that is the tomb 
of the dead saint25 and·concepts of ritual 
pollution26. 
Interaction of Beliefs 
It is against this background of interac-
tion of endogenous and exogenous belief 
systen1s that the author of this study has 
conducted interviews with rural Muslims 
and studied some of the published works 
of those espousing a particular mystical 
religious expression. The author has 
squght to examine the following: 
(a) The persistence of an endogenous 
belief system amongst people who claim 
to be and are known as Muslims in Bang-
ladesh. 
(b) The use of Islamic terminology, 
that is the terminology of a tradition ex-
ogenous to the area, in the expression of 
these endogenous beliefs. 
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The particular group under study call 
themselves marphati. Marphot is a word 
which has come into the Bengali lan-
guage from the Arabic, ma' rifat21. This 
word has the meaning of knowledge or 
gnosis. It is used by all Muslims but for 
Muslims of Sufi persuasion it has a par-
ticular significance. In Bangladesh it is 
rare for the word Sufi to be used. It may 
be used in literature or in debate but ordi-
nary Muslims of Sufi persuasion use the 
following terms, marphoti, tariqa and 
faqiri. F aqiri comes from the Arabic, 
faqir meaning poor. The suffix i is Per-
sian which gives the abstract noun. This 
indicates the Sufi or ascetic way of 
life28.Tariqa means path or system to be 
followed for the gaining of spiritual per-
fection29. Indispensable within the Sufi 
systems followed throughout the Indian 
sub-continent is the spiritual guide usu-
ally called murshid or pir 30. The disciple 
who places himself under the instruction 
of a guide (murshid or pir) to travel the 
path (tariqa) is known as murid. 
The words 'marphot' and 'tariqa' 
have widespread usage within Islamic the-
ology particularly in the Sufi systems but 
they are two very important key or code 
words to gain entry to a whole belief sys-
tem. A very important aspect to emerge 
from this study is the recognition that 
these beliefs are esoteric. 
There are intrinsic and extrinsic rea-
sons for the beliefs of the lmarphoti' 
groups of Bangladesh to be esoteric in na-
ture. The major intrinsic reasons for the 
esotericism are: 
(1) The true knowledge (inner reality) 
has to be passed on by personal contact 
and not through any outward means31. 
(2) A spiritual guide or pir is therefore 
necessary for the communication of this 
knowledge32. 
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(3) The nature of the beliefs in particu-
lar those that involve intimate sexual prac-
tices. 
The major extrinsic reason for the 
esotencism is that the beliefs are offen-
sive to the Muslim community in general. 
Historically, dating back to the first estab-
lishment of Muslim rule in Bengal in the 
thirteenth century which allowed migra-
tion of Muslims from Turkey, Persia, Af-
ghanistan and North India, there has 
always been a condescension if not con-
tempt on behalf of the Muslim immi-
grants into the area for the endogenous 
beliefs and language of the people of Ben-
gal33. Even Brahmanical Hinduism con-
sidered the lokayat (atheist) beliefs of the 
b d . 3lt area to e emomc . 
Following the establishment of British 
rule in the sub-continent, the differences 
and distrust between Hindu and Muslim 
communities were exacerbated. Increas-
ingly definition of the Muslim community 
was seen in its difference from the Hindu 
community35. As has been mentioned be-
fore, since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, there has been, in the area occu-
pied by present day Bangladesh, a height-
ening of Islamic consciousness. This has 
resulted in attempts at suppression of any 
beliefs or practices that seemed to conflict 
with the recognised Muslim identity. 
Thus social pressure has increased the in-
nate tendency for these beliefs to be 'un-
derground'. 
Apart from the antagonism of sections 
of the Muslim community to the beliefs 
endogerious to the region, the educated 
sections of both the Hindu and Muslim 
communities often ignored or knowingly 
or unknowingly misrepresented some of 
these beliefs. This was done usually by in-
cluding only those concepts present in the 
folk beliefs which fitted the liberal, toler-
ant, 'enlightened' outlook of the Bengali 
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intelligentsia, post nineteenth century. 
This can be seen, for example, in the atti-
tude of Rabindranath Tagore to the songs 
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of the Baul sect of Bengal . Tagore em-
phasised the longings of the human heart 
for union with the 'Man of the heart' 
found within the songs of the Baul sect. 
However he made little mention of the 
doctrine and practices of the esoteric cult 
involving sexo-yogic relations. 
Marphat and Tarika 
By far the majority of the Muslims of 
Bangladesh are classified as Sunni 37. The 
number of :fleople in Bangladesh claiming 
to be Shia 8, the second major grouping 
within the worldwide Muslim community 
or Umma, is unavailable but it is certainly 
not very large. There is one substantial 
mosque for this community in a suburb of 
Dhaka but apart from that, their presence 
is not obvious. 
Sunni and Shia have been concerned 
not only with religious belief but also 
with the leadership or political element of 
the life of the community. The movement 
which has had an enormous impact on the 
expansion of Islam but has not primarily 
been concerned with political issues has 
beenSufi-ism39• It was through the sufis 
that Islam really spread into India, Central 
Asia, Anatolia and Africa. But Sufi-ism in 
its formative stage was 'mainly an inte-
riorisation of Islam, a personal experience 
of the central mystery of Islam, that of 
tauhid, 'to declare that God is One'.'40 · 
Schimmel has described Sufi-ism as the 
'generally accepted name for Islamic mys-
. . ,41 
tlClSm 
From its earliest times, the distinctives 
of Su~-ism can be summarised as fol-
lows 2: 
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( 1) Emphasis on intimate knowledge and expe-
rience of God as compared to theological 
learning. 
(2) World denying 
( 3) Veneration by the mystic for his 
teacher/ shaikhlpir. 
(4) Willingness to include 'outside practices' 
and ideas provided that they seem to produce 
results in the spiritual quest. 
(5) Spontaneous missionary endeavours often 
penetrating to areas far from the centres of 
power and learning. They did not always in-
sist on a total and immediate abandonment of 
old habits and social ties upon the acceptance 
of I slam and they were tolerant of deviation. 
In ordinary Bangladesh society, par-
ticularly in the rural areas, the larger 
groupings within the worldwide commu-
nity of Islam, the issues of interpretation 
of law and the different modes of practice 
are not the matters of extensive discus-
sion. Some debate can be found regarding 
different ways to stand and in what posi-
tion the arms should be held during the 
. f . I 43 t1mes o ntua prayer . These may reflect 
some of the minor differences between 
the diffe~e~Sunni schools (madhhab pl. 
madhahzb) but they are not of wide-
spread significance and debate in most ar-
eas of rural Bangladesh. 
The most common classifications that 
are mentioned in the rural areas are 
shariati and mar]!hati or tarikat. Anne-
M . S h" ILJS. ane c tmme m a chapter devoted to 
Sufism in Indo-Pakistan in her book, Mys-
tical Dimensions of Islam, refers to the 
large body of mystical poetry and folk 
songs as marifati. An indication of this di-
vision can be seen in the book 'Sharaful 
lnsan which propounds the necessity of 
following a religious teacher (pir) and 
joining a tarika or path. There is a chapter 
devoted to explaining the difference be- . 
tween shariat and marphat. The author 
writes of them as distinct communities, 
even exhibiting some mutual antago-
nism46 
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Brother, within the different communities of 
modern Islam, there are different opinions 
and criticisms regarding shariat and tarikat. 
One community's opinion is this that if the 
shariat is present, then there is no necessity 
for the tarikat and there is no hint of the tari-
kat in the Hadith and the Quran. 
There is a whole genre of songs in 
Bangladesh known as pala gan, songs in 
tum or 'narrative opera'. In the songs, 
two singers will conduct a debate about 
the relative merits of two subjects. One of 
the favourite topics for this sort of dialec-
tic is shariat versus marphat. Conversa-
tions with followers of the marphat show 
the antagonism to the those whom they re-
gard as shariati. This is particularly 
focussed on the Muslim religious teach-
ers, Munshis, Maulobhis, Mullahs. 
However the tradition of criticism of 
religious leaders or clerics did not begin 
with the advent of Islam to Bengal but 
seems to have been directed at formal re-
ligion in general. There is an unconven-
tionality to the marphati. 
Ashim Roy in surveying the penetra-
tion of Islam into the masses of Bengal 
notes that both Brahmanical Hinduism 
and the Islam of the shariat rejected the 
language and culture of the people of Ben-
gal. Both were exogenous traditions. To 
the Hindu elite, Sanskrit was the 'divine 
language' and the language of the area 
was 'local' or 'natural' language47. 
Within the Muslin community throughout 
its history in Bengal, there has always 
been a tendency amongst a selection of 
the community to regard the expression 
of Islam in Bengali language and culture 
as compromising that religious faith. Cer-
tainly those sections of the Muslin com-
munity in Bengal who regarded their 
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family origins as beinf outside Bengal ex-
hibited this tendency 4 . This resulted in a 
'total rejection of the local language as 
their own religious-cultural me-
dium '49.Roy's thesis is that Islam only be-
came enculturated in Bengal through 
people whom he calls the 'Muslin cultural 
mediators'. As the elite of Hindu 
Brahmanical culture with Sanskrit as its 
language was forced to come to terms 
'with the little traditions of Bengal 
through the recognition and adoption of 
the local Bengali language'50,so the Mus-
lim cultural mediators were forced not 
only in the use of language but also in the 
use of idioms and concepts to adapt to the 
folk milieu of Bengal 51. 
The literature of the Muslim mystical 
writers of Bengal as well as the material 
collected in personal interviews empha-
sises the mystical esoteric approach tore-
ligion as compared to the doctrinal, 
formal and hieratic. The shariat repre-
sented the formal aspects of Islam. All 
knowledge obtained through scriptures, 
sastra, including both the Hindu scrip-
tures and the Muslim was not to be com-
pared with that of the secret esoteric 
knowledge 52. 
The formal does have a place in the 
writing of thew mystics of the past, the 
shariat is described as one of the stages 
(manjil) on the journey to the truth. The 
four stages are shariat, tariqat, haqiqat, 
and marphar3• In fact Ali Raja, are-
nowned poet and pir of the middle eight-
eenth century from the Chittagong 
district, in his work Agam, though high-
lighting the independence of each stage, 
also says that the four are essentially 
one
54
. Literature readily available today 
in Bangladesh emphasising the mystical 
path also stresses that the shariat is not to 
be denigrated but is to be seen as a stage 
along with the tariqat or is to be seen as 
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something for those who are simple and 
cannot cope with the profound and com-
plex55. However it is clear that to the mys-
tics concentration on the shariat, the 
fonnal, is not sufficient56. 
Within the Bangladesh Muslim com-
munity there have been sections in the 
past, as there are in the present, who 
would refuse to accept any division of the 
Muslim community into groups. Histori-
cally, certainly the sections of the Muslim 
community in Bengal who had a foreign 
orientation and rejected the local lan-
guage and culture, would have denied the 
validity of the esoteric mystical move-
ments. In modem day Bangladesh, those 
who have been influenced directly or indi-
rectly by the ongoin§ efforts to raise Is-
lamic consciousness 7 have claimed that 
the beliefs within the marphatiltariqat 
movement are heavily influenced by non-
Islamic beliefs. 
In the article in tarika58 i n the Sank-
hipta Islami Bishwakosh(The Shorter En-
cyclopedia of Islam) published by the 
Islamic Foundation of Bangladesh the Is-
lamic organisation in Bangladesh enjoy-
ing government support, the following 
comment is found regarding some of the 
popular movements using this term: 
Among these, pantheism, nature worship and 
many other doctrines have entered. 
·Extreme criticisms of beliefs associ-
ated with the tarika movement can also 
be found59. 
On the other hand books written at the 
popular level in Bangladesh proclaiming 
the benefits of following a pir or murshid 
and joining a tarika group, seek to answer 
the criticisms that the above comments 
typify60. The defenders of mysticism 
within the Muslim community seek to 
show that tasawujf, or in the language of 
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rural Bangladesh tarika, is not only legiti-
mate but also 'fulfilment' of Islam. The 
following are presented as the main rea-
sons for this: 
(1) It is in the Quran and Hadith, 
(2) It was practiced by the Prophet, 
(3) The explanation and interpretation of 
the Quran has always_ been done by spe-
cial people devoted to the Prophet begin-
ning with his immediate family namely 
Ali, 
(4) The spiritual knowledge cannot be 
give directly to ordinary people who are 
not familiar with spiritual things. 
There is and always has been a tension 
within Islamic thought regarding the 
exoteric and the esoteric. It has been Uni-
versally acknowledged that it was through 
the renowned AI Ghazali that Sufism re-
ally attained a secure position as a valid 
expression within Islam 61. AnneMarie 
Schimmel writes that though al-Ghazzali 
repudiated the tendency to concentrate on 
gnostic knowledge, a phenomenon com-
mon among some mystics during his life-
time, he stressed 'heart' religion and was 
not averse to using the Sufi experim~ntal · 
methods62• Arguments are put forward by 
. both sides ie those favouring the exoteric 
and those the esoteric, as to the contribu-
tion of al-Ghazzali and the purifying of 
Sufism from non-Islamic influences. 
Thus it is not surprising to find the follow-
ing comment by Rizvi regardirig criticism 
• • 63 . 
of the Bengah mystics : 
Some Muslim Bengali scholars characterize 
the mystic themes in Bengali works as hetero-
dox but the term is hardly applicable to the 
sufi movement in anY region. Sufism had had 
a long tradition of borrowing both ideas and 
practices from other non-Islamic mystical sys-
tems and Bengali sufis did not depart seri-
ously from the path shown by their 
predecessors.· .. 
Summary of Major Emphases 
within the Study Group 
Some of the major emphases identi-
fied within the marphati beliefs are: 
* The importance of a pir, master as 
(1) Giving fonn to the fonnless One, 
(2) Being a mediator, 
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(3) The repository of mystical knowledge. 
* The body as a microcosm of the uni-
verse and an associated mystical physiol-
ogy. 
* The importance of love in the apprehen-
sion of reality. For some this is found in 
the union of man and woman. 
* The use of linguistic co-incidence and 
similarity as evidence for the interpretive 
system eg dam -adam, nor, nari, nur, nir. 
Summary 
In summary the reasons for the nature 
of religious expression ·among the mar-
phati in Bangladesh are: 
(1) The nature of sufism particularly 
North Indian sufism; 
(2) The manner in which Islam was encul-
turated in Bengal; 
(3) The use of language from one tradi-
tion, the exogenous, to express the mean-
ing of another, the· endogenous; 
(4) The conservative nature of the agrar-
ian society in which survival values and 
associated beliefs are strongly entrenched. 
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Chinese Islam in the Nineties: A View of the 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 
Peter Riddell 
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1 Introduction 
The worldwide Islamic resurgence in 
recent ~ecades has captured the attention 
and imagination of both the media and 
populations in the West. This Western ob-
servation of, and at times preoccupation 
with, the seeming rise of Islam after ape-
riod of relative dormancy has been fo-
cused very much on events in the Middle 
East. The ongoing conflict and more re-
cent moves towards peace between Israel 
and its Arab neighbours is a major focus 
of attention, as are events within the Arab 
world related to the clash between rising 
Islamic radicalism and governments of a 
more nationalist, secular bent, such as 
Egypt and Algeria. 
The attention of the Muslim world it-
self has also been focused on such events. 
Indeed, the Islamic world may be seen as 
a large arena, with the spectators aligned 
in rows at ever increasing distances from 
the centre, but with the attention of all fo-
cused on that central stage ie the Middle 
East. This has the effect of placing certain 
actors, such as the Israelis and the Pales-
tinians, under continuous scrutiny, while 
other member groups, such as the Muslim 
communities on the geographical periph-
ery of the: Muslim world, receive consider-
ably less attention from their Muslim 
confreres or the world· at large. 
Yet there is much to be learned from 
events on that periphery. Indeed, the Is-. 
Iamie revival in recent decades has .not 
limited itself to the Middle East. The ·· 
world has witnessed in recent times con-
flict between governing authorities and 
radical Muslim groups in areas as distant 
from the Middle East as Malaysia and the 
Southern Philippines. However one Mus-
lim region which continues to rest in the 
shadows of international attention is repre-
sented by those areas of the People's Re-
public of China (PRC) where Muslims 
are found in significant numbers. 1 
1.1 Brief Historical Background to 
Islam in China 
Islam reached China from the Middle 
East and Central Asia in the early centu-
ries of Islam. A number of military 
clashes occurred between Muslim annies 
from the Middle East and forces of the 
Tang Dynasty (7th - 1Oth centuries CE), 
including the defeat of the Tangs at Talas 
in 751 CE. The entry of Islam to Western 
China was facilitated by the existence of 
the Silk Road, a trade route which had 
been established much earlier in the first 
centuries of the first millennium CE and 
which stretched from the area covered by 
the present day city ofXi'an in the East to 
Rome in the West. This trade route 
wound its way through the rugged terrain 
of Central Asia, to Persia, the Fertile Cres-
cent, leading to the shores of Asia Minor 
and on to various points in the Roman 
Empire. This route had been established 
during the Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 
CE). Such trading contacts facilitated the 
entry of Islam to the· region of China, and 
one can trace influences upon Chinese Is-
lam in examining archaeological·artefacts 
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uncovered in Western China. Museums in 
this region, such as that housing an excel-
lent collection in Guyuan, present an ar-
ray of artefacts from the early Islamic 
world, including swords, gold-plated sil-
ver goblets, gold wedding rings, coins 
and other items deriving from Islamic Per-
sia, Afghanistan, and other areas of Cen-
tral Asia. 
By the time of the late Tang Dynasty, 
the overseas trade of China was largely in 
the hands of Muslim Persians and Arabs2, 
and the later Mongols who dominated 
China also engaged foreigners, including 
many Middle Eastern Muslims, in a type 
of international civil seiVice to govern the 
Chinese3• Religious pluralism was al-
lowed to flourish under the Mongols and 
religious establishments, including those 
of the Muslims, were granted exemption 
from taxation4. Foreign trade for China 
continued to be carried out largely by 
Central Asian Muslims engaged by the 
Mongol overlords, and Ibn Battuta, the fa-
mous Arab traveller and writer, recorded 
that mid-14th century China contained 
significant numbers of Arabs resident in 
that country5. These influences led to a 
substantial process of conversion during 
the first half of the second millennium 
CE, especially during the period of the 
Ming Dynasty (1368 -1644)6. 
Relationships between the minority 
Muslim community and other Chinese 
communities were not always to be har-
monious, however. There were several pe-
riods of open revolt, especially during the 
centuries of the Qing Dynasty ( 1644-
1911), such as the abortive Muslim revolt 
in Chinese Turkestan in 1758-59, there-
bellion in Gansu in 1781, and the wide"' 
spread sporadic Muslim revolts against 
the Qings in Sinkiang during the period 
1855-1873. 
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Thus by the time of the establishment 
of the PRC in 1949, Muslim communi-
ties, though comparatively small in 
number, had been finnly established as 
part of the Chinese multicultural scene for 
almost one thousand years. The commu-
nist authorities were concerned to estab-
lish national stability and to avoid the 
communal disputes which had plagued re-
lations between the State and minority 
groups in the past. In this context, the 
communist authorities took a range of 
steps, including the establishment of the 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in its 
provincial planning, with this region be-
ing accorded a measure of autonomy in 
recognition of the fact that it housed a sig-
nificant minority group; i.e. the Muslim 
Huis. 
1.2 Population Distribution 
The Chinese Government conducted a 
nationwide census in 1990, which re-
vealed important infonnation about the 
size of the various Muslim minority 
groups in the PRC. Ten of China's minor-
ity nationalities are predominantly Mus-
lim. The census provided the following 
numbers for each of these groups: Hui 
(8.6 million); Uygur (7.2 million); 
Kazakhs (1.1 million); Dongxiang 
(375,000); Kyrgyz (375,000); Salar 
(88,000); Tajik (33,500); Uzbek (1~500); 
Bonan (12,000); and Tatars ( 4,873) . 
Thus Muslim nationalities accounted for 
17.6 million people, or approximately 
1.75% of China's population. 
With regard to the most populous of 
the various Muslim groups, the Huis, 
their numbers are spread throughout 
China, though a substantial group resides 
in the Nirigxia Hui Autonomous Region. 
In 1988, the population of Ningxia stood 
at 4, 150,000. Of this number, approxi-
mately thirty-two percent (1,238,000) 
were Muslim, around sixty-seven percen~ 
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(2,731,000) were majority Han Chinese, 
and the remainder comprised various 
other minority groups8• 
The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 
is divided into two prefectures and six-
teen counties. The Muslim population is 
more concentrated in the central and 
southern counties of Ningxia; i.e. 
Jingyuan (where they represent around 
97% of the county population), Haiyuan 
(approximately 70%), Xiji, Guyuan and 
Tongxin counties. 
2. Islamic Practice in Ningxia 
The Hui emergence as a distinct group 
was consolidated during the Yuan dy-
nasty (1271-1368) and subsequent Ming 
period. During this period, the Hui spoke 
a variety of languages - Arabic, Persian, 
and the Mandarin language of the major-
ity Han Chinese- but gradually the Hui 
assimilated to the ways of the Han, espe-
cially in the area of language, with the re-
sult that eventually the Hui came to speak 
Mandarin as their mother tongue9• This 
tendency towards assimilation to Han 
ways has been a cause of criticism of the 
Hui by their co-religionists among other 
minority nationalities in China. Neverthe-
less, it has also enabled the Hui to act on 
many occasions as a mediator between 
Han China and the various Muslim mi-
norities. 
Like the majority of Chinese Muslims, 
the Hui are predominantly Sunni, though 
Shi 'ite influences can at times manifest 
10 . themselves . Moreover, Sufi mystical or-
ders have exerted a strong attraction for 
Chinese Muslims, including the Hui. The 
most influential of these orders have been 
the Naqshbandiyya, Qadariyya and 
Kubrawiyya11. 
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Though the Hui represent a part of the 
Islamic mosaic of China, their practice of 
the faith, and the social context in which 
they locate Islam, makes their Islamic pro-
file distinctive in both Chinese and world 
Islamic terms. 
2.1 Mosques: Form and Function 
Mosques in Ningxia exist in abun-
dance. Whether found in County capital 
cities, townships or in remote villages, 
there are certain characteristic features 
which mark Chinese mosques as unique. 
The roofs of mosques typically repre-
sent a range of architectural styles. All dis-
play the characteristic Islamic crescent, 
usually placed on the most prominent 
point of the roof. Many also include a 
dome or domes, creating the Islamic roof . 
profile so characteristic of the Middle 
East. However, all will also include the 
pointed roof-ends reminiscent of Bud-
dhist pagodas which are so typical of Chi-
nese architecture. This serves to remind 
the faithful that although the origins of 
the religion lie elsewhere, the framework 
in which they worship is firmly grounded 
in Chinese tradition. 
Mosque walls are typically made of 
brick, or mud-brick in the case of village 
mosques. These walls will often include 
engraved inscriptions, sometimes in Ara-
bic but usually in Chinese. The walls are 
often also adorned with the beautiful 
wooden lattice work which typifies other 
Chinese architecture. 
Within the prayer hall of the mosque it-
self one is again struck by the combina-
tion of styles. The walls usually display 
an array of wall hangings, made of woven 
material or paper. These depict exhorta-
tions to action by the faithful, may be 
either in Arabic or Chinese, and include 
messages such as the Islamic witness12 
and calls to spread the faith around the 
world. The floors are covered by a combi-
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Fig. 1. Exterior of Bai Tang Mosque 
Fig. 2. Interior of Bai Tang Mosque, showing the mihrab 
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nation of rattan mats and woven carpets; 
the latter may be particularly prized by 
the local community. Such is the case 
with the beautiful cW'et placed just in 
front of the mihrab 1 in the Great 
Mosque in Tongxin County Centre. The 
local community proudly points out to the 
visitor that this c~et is valued at 
170,000 Renminbi 4 and was presented 
as a gift to the mosque by the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia. 
The Great Mosque in Tongxin is un-
doubtedly one of the principal Islamic 
landmarks in Ningxia. Built during the 
Ming dynasty and renovated during the 
Qing dynasty, it is the largest and oldest 
mosque in Ningxia. It is located within a 
compound which is elevated above the 
surrounding countryside and which there-
fore captures the attention of Tongxin resi-
dents both as they arrive in the city and as 
they move within the city precincts. The 
compound itself consists of three parts: 
the mosque with the adjacent student dor-
mitory and religious leader's residence, 
the yard of the compound and the area 
where the ritual ablutions are perfonned 
prior to prayer. Just outside the compound 
is found the Muslim cemetery, which it-
self contains an impressive shrine amidst 
the various graves. The Tongxin mosque 
sexves as a prime focal point for all 
Ningxia Muslims, as well as an important 
centre for study of the Hanafi school of Is-
lam:ic Law which predominates in 
Ningxia. 
In addition to the large mosques situ-
ated in the cities, one finds mosques of 
varying degrees of beauty even in the 
most remote villages in Ningxia. An ex-
ample is that found in the village of Bai 
Tang in Guyuan County .. Though the vil-
lage itself is very poor and lacks some of 
the most basic civic and health sexvices, 
the community has devoted a significant, 
Volume Eight, Number 2 
portion of its meagre resources to con-
structing a small but beautiful mosque, 
with adjacent residential quarters for the 
local religious leader. The mosque and its 
surrounding area is kept meticulously 
clean, and represents the most splendid 
building in the village. The mihrab is be-
decked above with various signs, includ-
ing a large sign in Chinese calling for 
Islam to be spread throughout the globe. 
The floor is covered by a collection of rat-
tan mats and beautifully woven carpets. 
Similarly, the village mosque in the 
very poor village of Qingyangquan in 
Tongxin County has received priority in 
the community's allocation of its limited 
resources, though it is much simpler than 
that in Bai Tang. The floors are covered 
mainly by rattan mats, and few signs are 
displayed on the walls. Nevertheless, it oc-
cupies a position of prominence within 
the village location, and resources have 
been devoted to constructing residential 
quarters adjoining the mosque to allow 
for the stationing of a religious leader in 
the community. 
The prioritising of the mosque in re-
ceiving meagre village resources reflects 
the fact that the mosque is the centre of 
each Hui community. The religious com-
munity, or Jiaofang, is the basic unit of 
Hui society, and is organised around the 
mosque, which functions as both a site for 
worship, and also as a venue for signifi-
cant public gatherings of many varieties, 
be they economic or social in nature. This 
is a characteristic feature of Hui society. 
2.2 Community Participation and 
Support 
Community support is vital for both 
the establishment and maintenance of the 
local mosque and its sexvices, whether at 
city, township or village level in Ningxia. 
Each family in village communities and 
also those members of the Muslim com-
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munity in larger centres are expected to 
contribute to the upkeep of the mosque 
and its religious leader. In some communi-
ties, this takes the fonn of a cash contribu-
tion; in some instances this may be as 
high as thirty Renminbi per family mem-
ber at intexvals according to the need of 
the mosque and its religious leader. In 
other instances in village settings, commu-
nity support for the mosque and its relig-
ious leader may be in the fonn of a grain 
contribution of one kilogram of grain per 
family member per annum or very poor 
families may be able to meet their obliga-
tion towards the maintenance of the relig-
ious leader by hosting him to dinner on a 
monthly basis, or more frequently if possi-
ble. At the village and township level, 
mosques thus receive a significant propor-
tion of their funding from the community. 
In return for these contributions from 
limited resources, community members 
receive a range of sexvices from the 
mosque and its religious leader. These 
sexvices include instruction in the Islamic 
sciences, guidance and counselling, and 
of course organisation of worship sexv-
ices. The principal sexvice, the Friday 
noon prayers, receives the full participa-
tion of men in the respective community, 
though women also attend as obsexvers. 
In the case of the larger mosques, the Fri-
day prayers thus provide a venue for the 
gathering of large numbers of Muslims. 
The Great Mosque in Tongxin attracts 
around six hundred worshippers to its Fri-
day prayers, with even larger numbers at-
tending services held to commemorate 
the special feast days, such as the end of 
the fasting month of Ramadan and the 
feast of the Sacrifice15. Nevertheless, it is 
in the village communities that worship 
sexvices can be considered to attract the 
highest proportion of local Muslims. In 
the larger urban centres, where popula-
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tions are more mixed between Han and 
Hui Chinese, the level of obsexvance 
among Muslims is lower due to a greater 
level of secularisation among urban Chi-
nese. 
2.3 The Religious Leader 
Thus the Islamic leader, or Ahung 
(Imam), attached to mosques in Ningxia 
is dependent for his sustenance to a large 
degree upon the local Muslim commu-
nity. While there are significant numbers 
of Ahungs available for the Ningxia Mus-
lim community, in certain areas Muslim 
communities are sexved by itinerant 
Ahungs, owing to the unavailability of a 
resident religious leader or the inability of 
the community to fund a full-time Ahung. 
In remote areas, there is an average of 
one mosque per administrative village16. 
Where a mosque does not have its own 
resident Ahung it will draw on the serv-
ices of an Ahung who is responsible for 
covering a number of different areas. 
The Ahung must be sufficiently versed 
in Arabic to lead the worship sexvices in 
that language. However, for the benefit of 
his constituency, he often translates the 
prayers into Chinese after initially pro-
nouncing them in Arabic. This is espe-
cially the case in remote areas of Ningxia. 
Apart from his responsibilities in leading 
worship, the Ahung devotes a significant 
proportion of his time to providing in-
struction to children who are sent by their 
parents to the mosque to learn the Qur'an. 
This study may take several fonns. It may 
be individual; one infonnant related that 
as a child he had received individual in-
struction for three months in reading the 
Qur' an from his local village Ahung. The 
Ahung's teaching methods were of inter-
est: using the scapula bone of a cow in 
place of a blackboard, the Ahung would 
write a· verse of the Qur' an which the stu-
dent was then required to memorise. 
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When the student had successfully mas-
tered the verse in this way, the writing 
was erased from the bone and replaced by 
another verse which in tum the student re-
peated after the Ahung. Though both boys 
and girls studied with this particular 
Ahung in this way, the ratio of boys to 
girls was heavily weighted towards the 
former17. 
The Ahung resident 
among the Qingy-
angquan community in-
dicated in interview 
that he himself had ac-
quired his knowledge 
of Arabic and the 
Qur' an by studying at 
the mosque in the Hai-
yuan County centre un-
der the resident Ahung 
there. The Qingy-
angquan Ahung, a 
young man in his twen-
ties, reported that he 
provided instruction in 
the Qur' an and Arabic 
to a group of twenty 
children from the vil-
lage for eight hours per 
day. Many students 
would study with him 
for several years, with 
this instruction repre-
senting an alternative 
system of education 
available to children 
whose parents could 
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by the local Ahung free of charge 18. 
In addition to providing religious in-
struction and leading in worship services, 
the village Ahung has a range of other 
functions, both in the religious domain, 
but also in overseeing aspects of general 
community welfare. He witnesses Hui 
weddings and presides over funerals, 
where the Ahung ensures that the body of 
not afford to pay the tui-
tion fees levied by the 
mainstream education 
system. The tuition in 
Arabic and the Qur' an 
at the Qingyangquan 
mosque was provided Fig.3. Ningxia muslim boy preparing for lessons in 
qur'anic recitation at Qirigyangquan mosque· 
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the deceased·is wrapped in a white cloth 
and buried promptly without a coffm19. 
The Ahung is also responsible for giving 
a name to newborn children soon after 
birth20. 
Though there is some inter-county 
movement by the Ahungs in Ningxia, 
mosques in Ningxia especially in remote 
locations are typically staffed by an 
Ahung,who comes from the local region. 
However, at the provincial level and even 
at the level of the county urban centre, 
some Ahungs are not native to Ningxia 
but have come from the broader Chinese 
Muslim community. 
2.4 Education Programs 
With regard to the educational process 
which Ahungs must go throu-gh in order 
to be properly qualified to practise their 
profession, the first step occurs with train-
ing during childhood in Arabic and the 
Qur' an, as described above. At this stage, 
the child may not know he wishes to be-
come an Ahung, but when this latter deci-
sion is made, the path is quite clearly · 
defined. 
The aspiring student will attach him-
self to one of the principal mosques in 
Ningxia, such as the Great Mosque in 
Tongxin. This mosque·inciudes dormitory 
facilities for around fifteen students, who 
undertake a course of study lasting at 
least four years, but in some cases extend-
ing up to seven, in order to gain a qualifi-
cation as an Ahung. Days are spent in 
study and reflection; the day commences 
with a period of worship, and is followed 
by many hours of tuition in Arabic and 
Persian languages and the lslamic·sci-
ences, with a special emphasis on the 
Qur' an and its commentaries.· A facility 
with Persian is required in order to be 
able to access some of the principal 
Qur'anic commentaries written in that lan-
guage. In order to gain entry to this pro-
gram of study, students should have al-
ready completed a period of secondary 
studies and demonstrated their capacity 
for further education. 
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At the Tongxin mosque, the teaching 
staff are most commonly drawn from Chi-
nese specialists, though guest teachers 
pay occasional visits from countries as far 
afield as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Ja-
pan, and the USA. The duration of the 
study program is determined by the indi-
vidual progress of each student. Upon suc-
cessful completion of the end of course 
examination, the student graduates and 
has several options available to him. He 
may choose to take up a position as an 
Ahung in a village mosque, and i~ now 
qualified to do so. Alternatively, if a stu-
dent has performed satisfactorily in his 
study program at the mosque, and has 
good Chinese, Arabic and Persian lan-
guage skills, this study program may 
serve as a pre-requisite for further studies 
in a specialist tertiary institution, such as 
the Arabic Language College in the 
Tongxin County centre. This College of- · 
fers intensive preparation in Arabic, Per-
sian and Islamic sciences, and after four 
years of study, the graduate is entitled to 
automatic employment in the Govern-
ment bureaucracy as an interpreter or in 
other specialist functions. Alternatively, a 
graduate from this College may seek a po-
sition as a religious leaderin one of the 
more prestigious mosques in one of the 
larger urban centres in Ningxia or else-
where in China. 
2.5 Religious Obligations and Cus-
toms 
With regard to observance of religiou3 
obligations among Muslims, the instruc-
tion which many Ningxia·Muslims·re-
ceive during childhood includes a focus 
upon the five basic duties of Islam21 . Nev-
ertheless, observance of these five duties 
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as a central part of daily life does not ap-
pear to be widespread among the Muslim 
community at large in Ningxia. Non-spe-
cialist Muslims in the community con-
sulted were not able to identify the five 
duties beyond the first two relating to wit-
ness and prayer which they listed as the 
principle obligations which a Muslim 
must fulfil. Nevertheless, there is an in-
creasing consciousness of the significance 
of the pilgrimage to Mecca. However, its 
cost is prohibitive for most Muslims in 
Ningxia, especially the large numbers liv-
ing in rural locations, and thus it is not 
fore grounded as a concept in their percep-
tion of their faith22. Though there has 
been a significant increase in numbers of 
Chinese Muslims undertaking the pil~­
age, from 19 in 1979 to 6,000 in 1992 , 
the proportion of the total Muslim popula-
tion involved is minuscule. 
In the area of more general custom, Is-
lamic practice in Ningxia closely parallels 
that followed in other parts of the Muslim 
world. For example, in mixed marriages, 
it is expected that the non-Muslim will 
adopt Islam, rather than the reverse. The 
convert is expected to participate in pre-
paratory courses for becoming a Muslim, 
which include studying basic Islamic be-
liefs and practices with the local Ahung. 
As is the case with other agrarian com-
munities elsewhere in the Muslim world, 
gender roles tend to be very clearly de-
fined amongst the Chinese Muslims of 
Ningxia. Women's participation in wor-
ship during the Friday prayers is more as 
observers, as described previously. Even 
with regard to participation in the health 
system, women's roles are largely deter-
mined by religious factors. For example, 
deliveries of newborn babies tend to be 
performed among the Muslim communi-
ties by the village midwives, rather than 
the village doctor, who is more com-
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monly male. This is less common among 
majority Han Chinese communities, who 
are less resistant to male village doctors 
performing this particular task. The same 
constraint prevents many Muslim women 
residents in villages from choosing to 
give birth in better equipped township 
hospitals, because of the lack of control 
they will have over selecting the gender 
of the hospital staff delivering the baby. 
Muslim communities in villages are 
very open and hospitable towards foreign 
visitors, and typically react quite openly 
to questions about their faith. Likewise, 
foreign visitors are welcome to view and 
photograph mosques. Though this is also 
the case in other parts of the Muslim 
world, Chinese Muslims, especially those 
in the more remote areas, are either un-
aware about or unconcerned with certain 
constraints existing in other parts of the 
Muslim world, such as that requiring en-
trants to the mosque to take off their 
shoes before entering the worship han24. 
2.6 Islamic Materials and Resources 
in Ningxia 
The student of Islam, whether an aspir-
ing Ahung or student destined for other 
appointments, depends for his Islamic ma-
terials and resources upon a range of gen-
eralist shops dealing in Islamic matters at 
various points throughout Ningxia. A pe-
rusal of several of these shops revealed 
that a range of materials were held, as fol-
lows: 
a. Books. As would be expected, each 
collection contained copious quantities in 
several editions of the Qur'an. This was 
available both in all Arabic format as well 
as in bilingual editions, in Arabic and Chi-
nese25. In addition to the text of the 
Qur' an, the shops examined also con-
tained sets of complete recordings of the 
Qur' an on cassette. 
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To complement this central work, vari-
ous commentaries upon the Qur' an were 
available for purchase. These included the 
multi-volume commentary entitled F _ 
zilal al-qur' an (Under the Shade of the 
Qur' an) written by the twentieth century 
radical theologian Sayyid Qutb, who was 
executed for subversion by the Egyptian 
Government of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 
1966. Another commentary which ap-
peared to be popular was Tafs _r Hussain_. 
In addition, there were various books 
in Arabic devoted to other Islamic sci-
ences, including Kitab al-ma' lin_ (The 
Book of Meanings), Qisas al-nab _ Mu-
hammad (Stories of the Prophet Muham-
mad), Durrat al-nashaz (Pearls of the 
Heights), Kitab al-kaba'ir (The Book of 
Sins), andAsas al-'ul m (The Founda-
tions of Knowledge). These holdings dem-
onstrate an interest on the part of the local 
Muslim population, particularly the spe-
cialists, with works addressing the three 
principal focuses of the Islamic sciences: 
theology, law and narrative. These works 
in Arabic were supplemented by various 
works in Chinese also dealing with mat-
ters such as the basics of Islam and the 
four schools of law in Islam. 
Finally, the shops consulted all con-
tained within their collections a three part 
series on Arabic language, a locally pro-
duced bilingual work with exercises in 
Arabic and grammatical explanations in 
Chinese which appears to be a standard 
text used in Arabic language classes 
throughout the autonomous region. One 
shop in Guyuan County centre indicated 
that it regularly provided copies of this 
text for use in classes in the Arabic Lan-
guage College in Tongxin. 
b. Other materials. In addition to book 
holdings, which appear to be drawn upon 
more by specialists among the Chinese 
Muslim community, the shops in question 
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also sold other items of more general in-
terest among the Ningxia community. 
These included the characteristic white 
hats worn by both male and female Mus-
lims in Ningxia; posters of various 
shapes, sizes and motifs of the type on dis-
play in mosques but also visible in private 
homes; woven prayer carpets; pieces of 
crockery, such as teapots, bearing Islamic 
phrases in Arabic; knives with Arabic in-
scriptions on the handles, and a range of 
other assorted items. 
Thus these shops serve as general 
stores, providing a wide range of materi-
als for use among both the specialists in 
the Ningxia Muslim community as well 
as the broader society itself. Staff in the 
shops indicated that members of the gen-
eral community provided a continuous 
supply of clientele, especially for the as-
sorted items, but also for some of the 
books, particularly the Qur'an, a copy of 
which was reportedly held by most 
Ningxia Muslim households. 
3. Ningxia and the World Islamic 
Resurgence 
3.1 The Nexus between Islam and 
Communism 
The relationship between the Muslim 
community and the Communist authori-
ties of the PRC since 1949 has been char-
acterised by periods of stability 
I 
interspersed with periods of communal 
strife. During its forty-five years of exist-
ence, the Communist government has 
· from time to time expressed a desire to 
preserve the rights of the more than fifty 
minority groups in China and to provide 
them with certain advantages to ensure 
that they do not suffer from their minority 
status. In the case of Hui Muslims, the 
Chinese Government established the 
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Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region as a de-
vice to protect them from being sub-
merged within the much larger Han 
community. It also took specific measures 
designed to win Muslim support, not only 
among the residents of Ningxia but also 
among Chinese Muslims in other loca-
tions. The authorities stimulated the for-
mation in 1957 of the China Islamic 
Association, an officially sanctioned um-
brella body which has served as an inter-
face between the government and the 
Islamic Community, and which has offi-
cial endorsement to oversee Muslim af-
fairs, co-ordinate publication of Islamic 
literature, and arrange for the training of 
Muslim leaders and Ahungs. In this latter 
context, the government, through the Is-
lamic Association, has provided assis-
tance to the Chinese Institute of Islamic 
Theology, which has as its principle pur-
pose the training of Islamic scholars who 
will serve Muslim communities around 
China26. 
An autonomous region in the PRC, 
such as Ningxia, derives certain advan-
tages from this status not accorded to 
fully fledged PRC provinces. The advan-
tages available to minorities in such re-
gions include the following: 
a. They are free to have up to three 
children, whereas majority Han Chinese 
are limited to the one child per family 
regulation determined by the national gov-
ernment27; ~ ' . . . 
b. They can gain entry to Chinese uni-
versities with a lower entry mark than that 
set for Han Chinese28; 
c. They-benefit from a tax waiver dur-
ing the first five years in establishing pri-
vate entetprises; 
d. They are given tax relief on agricul-
29 . 
tural produce ~ 
With regard to the interface between 
the Communist authorities and the Is-
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lamic worship community, the national 
government allows a measure of auton-
omy, up to a point. There are no restric-
tion on the number of mosques within a 
given area; the number will depend upon 
the respective community's wishes and 
its capacity to support the mosques and at-
tached Ahungs. Though it is largely the 
community's responsibility to provide the 
sustenance for the Ahungs, in the case of 
some Islamic leaders in the larger cities in 
Ningxia, the government contributes to 
their salary. Moreover, as seen pre-
viously, the government guarantees em-
ployment for graduates from the Islamic 
stream of education in Ningxia, such as 
the program at the Tongxin Mosque fol-
lowed by the Arabic Language College, 
in the same way that employment is guar-
anteed to university graduates from the 
mainstream education system. 
N~vertheless, the government main-
tains a watchful eye on the activities of 
the Muslim community and its leaders, es.;. 
pecially with regard to the level of mate-
rial and financial support expected of the 
community by its religious leaders. The 
government has created coordinating com-
mittees at the county level to monitor the 
level of support exacted from peasants by 
Islamic leaders, as a device to ensure that 
the religious institutions do not squeeze 
the peasants too hard by expecting unrea-
sonable or burdensome contributions. 
Indeed, many Muslims are also mem-
bers of the Communist Party, and in order 
to advance within the bureaucracy, mem..;. 
bership of the Party is virtually manda-
tory. This parallel membership in what 
appear to be two mutually exclusive 
groups suggests several factors: 
a. Those Muslims with dual member-
ship see no clash in such an arrangement,. 
which itself suggests that their under-
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standing of the basic duties and beliefs of 
Islam is superficial; 
b. Islamic revivalism from outside 
China, which would be opposed to basic 
tenets of the Communist ideology, is still 
slow to filter in at this stage of the devel-
opment of the PRC; 
c. The government still maintains a 
tight control over Muslim activity at the 
macro level to ensure that it operates in a 
way which is consistent with general na-
tional government policies and ideolo-
gies30. 
3.2 Recent Problems Among Chinese 
Muslims 
The relationship between the commu-
nist authorities of the PRC and its Muslim 
subjects has had a chequered history, and 
it would be useful to briefly examine a se-
ries of incidents since 1990 which point 
to the changing nature of the relationship 
between Chinese Muslims and their com-
munist government. 
In 1990 a series of riots occurred in 
the Province of Xinjiang, which borders 
the Islamic republics of central Asia, for-
merly belonging to the now defunct 
USSR. Reports in the media indicated 
that this trouble in Xinjiang was aided 
and abetted by activists based in Turkey, 
with the riots being directed against eth-
nic Han Chinese resident in Xinjiang. The 
problems in Xinjiang in 1990 were evi-
dently not resolved, as it has continued to 
represent a hot bed of resistance to com-
munist authority. Reports from diplomats 
indicate that around one dozen bombs 
were detonated in various parts of Xin-
jiang during the summer of 1993, with 
these bombings killing a number of Han 
Chinese. Responsibility for these inci-:-
dents was laid at the feet of the East 
Turkestan Party (ETP), a separatist group 
which wishes to break away from the 
PRC. The government of the PRC ex-
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pressed concern at what they termed "hos-
tile foreign forces" which had infiltrated 
the region; this referred to accusations 
that the ETP was based in Turkey and 
funded by sympathisers in neighbouring 
Kazakhstan. During 1993 the government 
of China approached Turkish and Kazakh 
authorities in an attempt to contain the ac-
tivities of the ETP, evidently without suc-
cess. Media reports indicate that the 
government of the PRC is concerned at 
likely connections between the ETP and 
international Mujahedeen groups which 
have provided arms to Chinese Muslim re-
sistance groups. During 1993, the commu-
nist authorities responded to the 
emergency in Xinjiang by sending troops 
to that region to protect Han Chinese 
from attacks by local Muslims. 
The year 1993 also witnessed distur-
bances among Muslim groups in the west-
em province of Qinghai. Massive street 
protests by thousands of Muslims in Xin-
ing, the capital of Qinghai, resulted from 
the illegal publishing by a local publisher, 
the China Times Publishing Company, of 
a comic book from Taiwan entitled A 
Swift Turn in Thinking. This book de-
picted Muslims in prayer beside a pig. 
The protests in Qinghai overflowed to 
neighbouring regions, including the 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu, 
ShaaiL"{i and Sichuan. In response to these 
events, Muslims in Qinghai formed them-
selves into a group called the Qinghai 
Muslim Anti-Humiliation Committee 
which was promptly banned by provincial 
authorities in early September 1993. 
These authorities followed up this ban-
ning with raids on mosques, and there 
were violent clashes between police and 
rioters. The authorities in the province ac-
cused the Committee of illegal fund rais-
ing and incitement to protest. Although 
the provincial authorities issued a public 
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apology, arranged for the dismissal of the 
head and deputy head of the publishing 
company and banned the book, the situ-
ation remained tense for some time. 
In mid-November 1993, matters came 
to a head once again with the publication 
of a newspaper article in Qinghai's capi-
tal which was entitled "The Woman Who 
Recites the Scripture and the Dog Who 
Listens to It". This precipitated a public 
demonstration which disbursed after po-
lice and army warnings. The licence of 
the newspaper containing this article was 
withdrawn and the editors were interro-
gated by police. 
In response to these ongoing prob-
lems, the President of the China Islamic 
Association, Ilyas Shen Xiaxi, who was 
China's most senior Muslim, spoke out 
against the unrest by Muslims, blaming it 
upon agitators. He warned Muslims 
against usin~ mosques to oppose the com-
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murust party . 
These events point to the tenuous na-
ture of relationships between certain 
groups of Chinese Muslims and the com-
munist authorities. Nevertheless the de-
gree of resistance to communist control 
does not appear to be unifonn throughout 
the Chinese Muslim community. It would 
appear that separatist tendencies are much 
more pronounced in the western prov-
inces which border the Islamic republics 
of the fonner Soviet Union, while commu-
nities in regions such as Ningxia which 
are somewhat more remote from external 
Muslim groups may be less prone to com-
munal problems at this stage. Neverthe-
less, the problems centred upon the 
provinces of Xinjiang and Qinghai in re-
cent years did overflow to the southern 
counties in Ningxia, with several being 
closed to foreigners for several months in 
late 1993 during the height of the distur-
bances. · 
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4. Conclusions 
Islam has been a part of the Chinese 
multicultural landscape for around one 
thousand years. Unlike the case of the 
Moghul emperors in India, Chinese Mus-
lims were never strong enough to consti-
tute a foveming dynasty in their own 
right3 . Nevertheless, Muslims in China 
were an integral part of the worldwide Is-
lamic community through trade and relig-
ious contacts for centuries, until the 
period of relative isolation after the estab-
lishment of the PRC in 1949. 
It has been seen that Chinese Islam is 
distinctive in certain ways. This is well 
demonstrated in the architecture of the 
many mosques which exist throughout 
the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. 
The Muslim community has become 
largely self-sufficient through its relative 
isolation from the rest of the Muslim 
world during the last forty-five years. It 
has developed an active education system 
both for young children and adults which 
ensures a minimal level of understanding 
of the faith among members of the gen-
eral community, and provides a degree of 
specialist training for those wishing to be-
come religious leaders. Community sup-
port for this education process, and 
indeed for the broad activities carried out 
by the mosque, is essential. 
Chinese government policy has effec-
tively served as a type of cocoon to pre-
vent Chinese Muslims from experiencing 
the same degree of instability which has 
characterised certain Middle Eastern Mus-
lim communities, such as Iran, Egypt and 
Algeria during the last twenty years. Nev-
ertheless, the early signs are there that 
this cocoon-like environment will not en-
dure forever. The troubles experienced in 
various parts of Muslim China in late 
1993 point to Muslim sensitivity·which is 
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reminiscent of that found elsewhere in the 
Muslim world. The existence of the writ-
ings of leading radicals of the modem era, 
such as Sayyid Qutb, for sale among the 
general Muslim community also suggests 
the beginning of a process which may 
lead to instability in the future. Moreover, 
the Chinese government's own policy of 
slowly opening the county to economic 
and social reforms suggests that though 
Chinese Muslims have been somewhat 
sheltered from the dynamic of Islamic re-
vivalism elsewhere in the Muslim world 
until now, the future may bring substan-
tial changes and may lead to a reintegra-
tion of Chinese Muslims within the 
broader Islamic world in terms of relig-
ious and political currents and counter-
currents. 
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At the Edge of the Crescent: Islam in the Southern 
Philippines 
Peter Sales 
History and Politics Wollongong 
Those who attack the sanctity of Islam are evil 
The Tausug are Moslems 
The Spaniards are attacking the Tausugs 
Therefore: The Spaniards are evil. 
To be innocently killed is meritorious 
A person is innocent if attacked by an evil person 
Therefore: To be killed by the Spaniards is meritorious. 
'God did not create the world in jest', 
the Holy Qur'an cautions sternly (Surahs 
21:16 & 44:38). Such an admonition has 
never been necessary for any student of 
the situation in the southern Philippines. 
Apart from the irrepressible good humour 
of the people themselves, little of the jocu-
lar is to be discerned in that unforgiving 
environment. The abiding concern has 
been survival, a goal achieved only after 
centuries of bloody resistance. Yet anned 
struggle itself has led to a general percep-
tion of the Moros as warlike, backward, 
and implacable. The.image of the crazed, 
kris-wielding warrior running amok or 
perfonningjuramentado h~ become at 
once a figure of terror and contempt. 
Muslim demands have actual~y been 
quite straightforward. 'Our public land 
should not be given to people other than 
the Moros ... Our practices, laws and the 
decisions of our Moro leaders should be 
respeCted',· a 1935 declaration stipulated. 
'Our religion should not be curtailed in 
any way ... Once our religion is no more, 
our lives are no more.' 1. The urgent sim-
plicity of the Muslim position, however, 
went largely unnoticed by outsiders, who 
saw only another example of the menace 
of resurgent Islam. 
The demonisation of Islam in general 
scarcely requires comment. Nor is it espe-
cially safe to do so; considerable risk at-
taches even to suggesting that the barrage 
of adverse media coverage may not be 
wholly deserved. The West is the new 
god, triumphant over its communist rival, 
confidently supervising the Leninist ex-
tinction, arrogantly secure in its free mar-
ket rationalism. It can do no wrong. Yet, 
as Edward Said recently suggested: 'Real 
intellectual analysis forbids calling one 
side innocent, the other evil. Indeed the 
notion of a side is, where cultures are at.is-
sue, highly problematic, since most cul-
tures aren't watertight little packages, all 
homogenous, and all either good or evil '2. 
Such appeals tend to be swamped by 
the alannist hysteria of Western report-
age. 'The images of Islam prevalent in the 
world are of brutality, fanaticism, hatred 
and disorder', according to one commen-
tator. 'Libyans killing policewomen in 
London, Palestinians hijacking passenger 
planes, Iranians seizing foreign embassies 
and Indonesians blowing up the 
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Borobudur temple in Java'3. As V S Nai-
paul reported after his own Islamic jour-
ney: 'Rage was what I saw ... Muslims 
crazed by their confused faith ... Islam 
sanctified rage -rage about the faith, P,Oliti-
cal rage: one could be like the to her'4• 
Updating this theme (for there is truly 
nothing new under the sun), Bernard Le-
wis published 'The Roots of Muslim 
Rage' in Atlantic Monthly [September 
1990]. Even more recently, an issue of the 
Far Eastern Economic Review [March 9, 
1995] featured a cover story titled 'Rage 
of Islam'. The latest Frederick Forsyth 
thriller, Fist of God [London: Corgi, 
1995] recounts a devilish plot by a Mus-
lim leader (guess who?) to create Qubth-
ut-Allah, a devastating Iraqui 
super-weapon for use against the West. 
The May/June -1995 number of there-
spected Foreign Affairs carries a series of 
articles grouped under the heading of 
'The Islamic Cauldron'. 
Whatever the validity of this scenario 
of anger and frustration, Mindanao ap-
pears to be a part of the Islamic crescent 
which is trapped in an endless nightmare 
of religious conflict. The past is too 
bloody to recall, the present remains 
fraught with danger, and the future only 
threatens worse to come. Conjuring up vi-
sions of jihad and crusade, the media has 
attributed the violence to a resurgence of 
Muslim-Christian frictions. Although 
such explanations are spurious and mis-
leading, more level-headed discourse is 
rendered ineffective by a range of compet-
ing constraints and injunctions. 
Much less noticed than Islamic move-
ments elsewhere and very poorly under-
stood in general, the Bangsamoro of 
Mindanao has religious and historico-cul-
tural roots which stretch back for centu-
ries, predating both the advent of 
Catholicism and the creation of the mod-
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em Philippine state. The population of 
Mindanao contains a vast cultural and 
ethno-linguistic mix. Especially signifi-
cant is the fact that the Moro populace is 
far from homogenous. It is an amorphous 
collection of richly diverse communities 
which differ greatly one from another. 
These people exhibit what one observer 
has called 'internal divisions of seemingly 
endless variety'. Yet the press seizes 
upon the Christian-Muslim tensions with 
a certaint~(· born of ignorance and blames 
militant Islam for most of the civil unrest, 
presenting every crime, ethnic dispute, or 
bandit's misdeed as akin to Saladin's re-
venge. 
Muslim traders brought their faith to 
the Philippines along with a lucrative 
commerce at least half a millennium ago . 
Sharif Kabungsuwan is usually identified 
as introducing Islam to Cotabato from Jo-
hore early in the sixteenth century, but he 
was almost certainly preceded long be-
fore by intrepid Arabic voyagers. Al-
though Kabungsuwan embarked on a 
period of conquest and proselytisation, 
the peaceful spread of Islam better distin-
guished the conversion of Mindanao. 
These common ancestors have been of 
primary importance in establishing the 
myths of origin which endow legitimacy 
to Muslim Mindanao. As Devin De Weese 
has noted about the faith elsewhere: 
The conscious discursive act - which we wit-
ness above all in oral tradition - of attaching 
those mythic accoutrements to an ancestral 
figure accepted by or asserted for a commu-
nity is itself a political statement on the ulti-
mate legitimacy of that community, essentially 
marking an assertion that the community's 
origins are equivalent to the origins of the uni-
verse, or at least of the universe's significant 
and relevant component, that of human be-
ings.5 
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Legends about the coming of Islam to 
Mindanao, too, extend the collective 
memory beyond the historical text to 
seJVe nothing less than a sacerdotal func-
tion. Thus were certain narratives sacral-
ised as part of a rehearsal for the social 
and political organisation of the Bang-
samoro. 
Islam flourished in its new home, de-
spite the rigorous efforts of the Spanish 
conquistadors. Viceroys in Manila 
mounted frequent expeditions against the 
south. '[l]nasmuch as the chief of Min-
danao has been deceived for some time 
by preachers from Barney who preach the 
doctrine of Mahoma, and it is said that 
there are preachers there endeavouring to 
convert them all into Moros', Governor 
Francisco de Sande in 1579 commanded 
the adventurer Grabiel de Rivera to seize 
the culprits, 'bum the edifice wherein the 
accursed doctrine was read and taught, 
and ... order that none other like it be 
built'6. 
The region continued to resist the gov-
ernment in Manila along with the militant 
Catholicism which it represented, recreat-
ing a conflict between cross and crescent 
which had begun with the Moorish occu-
pation of the Iberian peninsula half a 
world away. Futile incursions were made 
by Spanish missionaries until the whole 
archipelago was lost forever in 1898. 
In their tum, the Americans first sup-
pressed Filipino revolts mercilessly, then 
set about preparing the country for inde-
pendence. Washington promoted its pol-
icy of integration as a precondition for 
self-government and the Christian popula-
tion largely accepted the validity of this 
objective. To Moros, however, integration 
was no more than assimilation; by either 
label, the process was tantamount to the 
destruction of their culture. 
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While the Moros never surrendered to 
the colonials, their resistance far tran-
scended mere fighting and warfare. It 
went to the very core of the Muslim expe-
rience. That proud heritage has become 
an integral part of the way in which the 
people of Moroland defme themselves. 
This is best encapsulated in some of the 
regional literature. For example, the 
Tausug ballads of parang sabil (literally, 
fighting for Allah) represent a tradition of 
heroic songs which emphasise important 
values and virtues demonstrated by the 
sabilallah (a person who dies for the 
faith). 
In a well-known Tausug epic, the 
young lovers Abdullah and Putli' lsara de-
cide to perform parang sabil after the girl 
is raped by a Spanish officer. Although 
her father condemns the plan, the pair go 
to the Spanish headquarters with con-
cealed weapons and perish in a struggle 
during which they manage to kill thirty 
soldiers. The lesson drawn by the poem is 
that it is wrong 'to touch a betrothed girl'. 
The father refuses to collect the bodies be-
cause his daughter had defied him, but the 
mother goes to the. fort, where she hacks a 
n~nber of Spaniards with a sharp kris be-
fore herself being shot down. The 
stricken son follows his mother and also 
kills several of the enemy. But he is cap-
tured and subsequently adopted by one of 
the officers. The father, bereft of his fam-
ily, soon pines to death. The dirge con-
cludes that 'The song has ended/ Nothing 
more can we add to it/ We leave it as are-
minder/ To relatives and friends' 7. 
The darangan of the Maranao and Ma-
guindanao is a similar epic. An entire di-
mension of the Islamic credo can be 
detected in such melancholy tales. In this 
literature, according to Samuel Tan, 'the 
Moro moves from one value configura-
tion to another and yet something com-
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mon runs through the diversity'. The ac-
tual worth of cultures is measured herein 
by their anti-colonialism and resistance to 
foreign intrusion. But other songs are 
sung and other virtues lauded. As Tan has 
emphasised: 'The various images of the 
many Moro personalities simultaneously 
portray the Moro as a lover of peace, a hu-
manist interested in creativity and a per-
son sensitive to the rhythm of nature and 
the universe'8. 
Orientalism has been a special trans-
gression in the demeaning of Muslim cul-
tures. Portrayal of the East as mysterious, 
voluptuous, and a place 'where sexual de-
sires could be gratified to the hilt' has fig-
ured in the European imagination for 
centuries. Extending the work of Edward 
Said's Orienta/ism, Rana Kabbani has 
conjectured about the myths of the Orient 
which build upon Qur'anic ideas of Para-
dise: 'Christians were morally refined and 
longed for a bodiless heaven; Muslims 
were spiritually coarse and could not en-
visage bliss that was not corporeal' 9• 
Islam was, of course, a threat long be-
fore it became a problem. The Moro pres-
ence in Mindanao is most usually 
problematised as a persistent, unsolvable 
conundrum by those experts who study 
the situation in the southern Philippines. 
Islam itself appears to be most often con-
sidered in terms of resurgence or decline. 
A more sensible approach would seem-> 
to acknowledge vitality as a force of resis-
tance, first against the Spanish, then the · 
Americans and Japanese, and now against 
Visayan and other Christian settlers as 
well as the Philippine state itself. Islam 
has served as a unifying force in Mora-
land, a divisive influence in the archipel-
ago as a whole. The Dar-at-Islam has 
also established the Bangsamoro as an in-
tegral part of the enormous population of 
Muslims throughout Southeast Asia and 
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beyond. Moroland is, after all, a near-
neighbour to the Indonesian archipelago, 
which has the largest Muslim population 
in the world. 
Yet recent trends in migration have 
made the Islamic communities of the 
southern Philippines into a minority in 
their own land. This has a very important 
impact upon the practice of the faith. 
Most Islamic communities enjoy numeri-
cal superiority within their own countries, 
which cle~rly raises many questions 
about the relations between religion and 
the state apparatus. Part of being a Mus-
lim has been to live in an Islamic state 
and there is a certain compulsion upon 
those who live in enclaves to observe ji-
had; that is, seek a more accommodating 
place to live - and over quarter of a mil-
lion Moros have moved to Sabah since 
the end of the Pacific war. This puts an ex-
ceptional burden of suffering upon those 
who feel ignored by their government - or 
even suspect that it is at war with them! ;.. 
yet are too poor or otherwise do not wish 
to emigrate. 
There is also a reverse aspect to their 
predicament. As John Esposito has noted: 
'Without a new, revised Islamic position 
on the status of non-Muslims in a Muslim 
state, non-Muslim minorities may well 
wonder what the increased sense of Is-
lamic identity and community may hold 
in store for them' 10. This has been a ma-
jor stumbling block to achieving harmoni-
ous relations in those few southern 
provinces with Islamic majorities and has 
made Christians very suspicious about 
agreeing to the extension of the size and · 
authority of the Autonomous Region of 
Moro Mindanao (ARMM). Such sensitive 
issues are complicated extraordinarily by 
the incipient pressure of outside business 
interests. 
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In this context, Moroland has tended 
to experience modernity as a particularly 
insidious fonn of peripheral· capitalism 
burdened with semi-feudal mechanisms 
together with an insistent process of West-
ernisation which threatens the communal 
life of the entire region. Moroland re-
mains as troubled by the contradictions of 
Islamism as anywhere else, with a tradi-
tional and reactionary theocracy com pet-
ing against radical fundamentalism and 
revivalism on one side and Islamic liberal-
ism, refonnism, and even feminism on 
the other. 
Concerned about the prevalent notion 
of Western success, various Islamic pro-
gressives have confronted the challenges 
of modernity in the way their forbears re-
sponded to European colonialism. No less 
a figure than John Esposito has pro-
nounced: 'Islamic modernism, like much 
of the modem Muslim response to the 
West in the twentieth century, had an ani-
bivalent attitude toward the West, a simul-
taneous attraction and repulsion' 11• While 
undoubtedly relevant to the situation in 
the southern Philippines, such a generali-
sation does not take the study of Moro-
land very far. 
How, then, to engage the debate about 
local transfonnations within the so-called 
globalisation of modernity? For many Is-
lamic observers, the modem remains no 
more than the European Other. There is a 
sort of double alienation from not only 
the foreign influence itself, but also from 
the subsequent medievalisation of Arabic 
culture. This response goes to the heart of 
postcolonial tensions between traditional-
ism and Westernisation. Ira Lapidus has 
discussed these issues in tenns of Islami-
sation and secularisation: 
Apart from social institutions, Islam remains 
in the hearts and minds of individual Muslims 
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an essential component of personal and politi-
cal identity. To be a Muslim, after all, is not 
only a matter of state office, ulama colleges 
and Sufi hospices, but of individual morality, 
and personal and social identity. Islam is the 
name of the primordial personal and group 
sentiment that defines for the individual be-
liever both personal existence and the exist-
ence of a truly human community. Thus the 
neo-Muslim movements are not only 
grounded in institutions but in the cultural 
and symbolic meaning of I slam. 
To Lapidus, then, there is an important 
academic challenge to examine the extent 
to which 'Muslim people still and will 
continue to constitute Islamic societies in 
the historic sense'12• 
Over recent times, Islam in Mindanao 
has been studied by a number of sympa-
thetic outsiders. Prominent among these 
was the late Peter Gowing, an American 
missioner who came to the Philippines af-
ter serving as a chaplain in the US Navy. 
As the founding director of the Dansalan 
Research Center in Marawi City, he be-
came an acknowledged expert on Muslim 
affairs. But he belonged to a period in 
which assimilation was still deemed possi-
ble. He wrote and preached the message 
of reconciliation. 'The Moros have not 
come empty-handed into the Philippine 
nation', he counselled distrustful sceptics. 
'They contribute rich, bright colours to its 
tapestry of cultures; they add excitement 
and glory to the history of its struggle 
against foreign domination; and they en-
hance the intelligence, energy, and v~our 
of the nation's dynamic population' 1 . 
Unfortunately, Gowing and many oth-
ers watching the situation during the 
ghastly bloodshed of the 1970s were not 
well placed to discern the broader context 
of the forces at work in Mindanao. They 
were, above all, unable to concede or con-
ceptualise a Moro victory against the Phil-
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ippine state. An important aspect of the 
anti-colonial project here as elsewhere 
has been the emergence of subnational 
groups based upon cultural, religious, and 
ethnic regionalism. This development has 
seemed on occasion to contain the threat 
of various types of extremism, political in-
stability, and even the disintegration of na-
tion states themselves. 
'The Philippine movement for auton-
omy fits into ... the Islamic concept of um-
mah or commonwealth of Muslim 
believers, both as individuals and as enti-
ties organized as nations', Ralph 
Braibanti wrote recently. 'Ideologically 
the Muslim world senses a profound com-
munion which has not been suppressed by 
modem nationalism but continues to exist 
as a powerful primordial sentiment of 
transcendent importance'. Nowhere is 
this expression of religious community 
stronger than in Mindanao, Braibanti 
noted, where the Islamic minority endures 
in dar-al-harb (literally, the domain of 
war)14. 
Nor have Muslims fared very well 
from their participation in national life. 
Their involvement in Filipino politics has 
been especially unfortunate. Moro leaders 
were compromised by their role in the no-
torious New Society movement of Presi-
dent Ferdinand Marcos, for example. 
Some local warlords were actually cro-
nies of the dictator. But niostof the cur-· 
rent suspicion cast upon Islam in the 
southern Philippines resembles attacks · 
made upon the faith elsewhere. There are 
first and foremost those criticisms which 
h~lVe been levelled at the faith in general. 
A number of scholars - ~osfnotably 
Edward Said in several perceptive studies 
- have responded by critiCising the way · 
the Orientalised Other has been incorpo-
rated into Western discourse 15. In similar 
vein, some observers have begun writing 
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of Islamism as an alternative to pejorative 
and limiting tenns like revivalism, fanati-
cism, and fundamentalism. lslamism spe-
cifically comprises the activities of 
militant Muslims seeking to promote their 
religious concepts as essential ingredients 
of both state and society. 
Today there remains a tendency 
among outsiders not to take Islam in the 
Philippines seriously or otherwise to mis-
understand it in significant ways. It has 
been identified as little more than a frag-
ment of faith washed ashore rather un-
comfortably in an island state which has 
since become a bastion of Catholic Chris-
tianity. Meanwhile, Muslims in Metro 
Manila constitute those most exposed to 
external judgment. This group comprises 
a high proportion of refugees and urban 
poor. They are largely confined to certain 
parts of the capital, often denied access to 
basic services like education, and held in 
fear and contempt by other residents. 
Worse still, their adherence to Islam is 
frequently belittled. Even Peter Gowing 
could write of Moros in earlier times hav-
ing 'only scant knowledge of their relig-
ion', but 'sticking fanatically to what little 
they knew' 16. In another context, Devin 
DeWeese has noted Westerners casting 
doubt upon the 'seriousness' of Muslims 
in Inner Asia, implying pretence in regard 
to belief, and assuming some sort of 
'light' or 'nominal' Islamisation17; This 
misreading of an alien faith could be due 
to no more than ignorance, but it might 
also indicate·a clever device to delimit 
and trivialise a· rival. 
Part of the ·presumption that Islam in 
the Philippines is to some extent untrue to 
the faith,. shallow, immature, or even out 
of place arises in the first instance as are-
flection of a central concern of Catholi-
cism. To all· intents and purposes, the 
dominant religion of the archipelago lies 
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across a range of animist or other indige-
nous beliefs and superstitions with a light-
ness which at once confinns its religious 
hold over the country, but makes many 
adherents nervous about being challenged 
as themselves inadequate propagators of 
the mother church. Those sensitive about 
such accusations of deviance are quickest 
to see it in others. 
Yet the very process of lslamisation is 
itself a problematic as well as inelegant 
tenn. It presupposes two contrapuntal de-
velopments: First, the introduction of the 
new faith into local communities, along 
with its nonnative modes of thought and 
action; and second, the incorporation of 
indigenous fonns into Islamic principles 
and practices. Thus can a range of pre-or 
non-Muslim elements have a bearing 
upon Moro religious life. 
The synthesis of Islamic adherence 
with pre-Islan1ic fonns has tended to be 
of interest mainly to outsiders, although 
events since the early 1970s - which have 
conspired to make the Moro communities 
feel embattled and threatened - have un-
doubtedly led to greater emphasis on relig-
ious obligation and orthodoxy. The 
blending of Islamic ways with those of lo-
cal tribes can be especially discerned in 
the 'rites of passage'. Ceremonies dealing 
with birth, coming of age, marriage, and 
death vary considerably from place to 
place, but they always retain a solid core 
of orthodoxy. The pag-gunting (or bap-
tism) practised by the Tausug people is es~ 
pecially fascinating as the ritual of 
wetting the child's head strongly suggests 
a Christian borrowing. Throughout Min-
danao, a range of diverse religious prac-
tices complements the central belief 
system of Islam. 
This duality has been dubbed Folk Is-
lam. It is reflected in the 'popular religios-
ity' of the broader, predominantly 
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Christian Filipino community. This has 
led to an ostensible difference between 
'Great Tradition' and 'Little Tradition' in 
both faiths. There is alleged to be a deep-
seated sense of the supernatural along 
with a set of metaphysical beliefs underly-
ing all religious life of the Philippine~. 
The practices and artefacts of Catholicism 
are certainly widespread, but their mean-
ings have long since coalesced with the in-
digenous belief systems of the 
archipelago. 
Folk Islam is at once similar to this 
general Philippine phenomenon and some-
thing else as well. It has in the past been 
too quickly identified as some sort of 
mockery of the true faith. Much has been 
made of the fact that some Islamic prac-
tices are observed rather carelessly. Lax-
ity of observance is, of course, a common 
human frailty and little or nothing should 
be implied from such behaviour. 'Let 
them cease to apply to their scanty obser-
vation of native life the test of their still 
more imperfect knowledge of the law and 
doctrine of Islam', a tum-of-the-century 
Dutch scholar warned Western visitors to 
Southeast Asia, 'in order to arrive at the 
surprising conclusion that the Malays, 
Javanese, Achenese, etc. are not nations 
of theologians and jurists or book-Mo-
hammedans modelled from wax' 18. 
In fact, recent scholars seem to go 
much further than Peter Gowing and his 
ilk in their attempts to conceptualise Folk 
Islam. The belief system which came to 
the Philippines through the crescent of 
Asia had already escaped the restrictions 
and narrow rigidity of the Arabic socie-
ties. Infused with Indian mysticism, the re-
ligion which literally washed ashore in 
Mindanao was a form of Folk Islam from 
the outset. Samuel Tan concludes 'that it 
is only possible to conceive of Islam or Is-
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Iamie civilization as a ''folk islamic tradi-
tion'"19 
In the Philippines no less than else-
where, Islam is based upon belief or faith 
(aqidah) and action (amal). Neither has 
value without the other. The behaviour of 
the individual believer is governed by the 
sharl.ah, the divine law of Allah. The ju-
risdiction of Islamic law has been a par-
ticularly contentious issue in dealings 
with the Philippine government; mean-
while, an increasing number of shariah 
lawyers are graduating from Mindanao 
State University (MSU). 
According to a famous hadith, Islam is 
not intended to be a burden. Worship and 
ritual are based upon an austere simplic-
ity. There is in essence only duty to Al-
lah, personal obligation, and a collective 
response. Dar al-I slam (or the House of 
Islam) rests upon the five pillars of Din 
(those things which are done rather than 
believed); specifically, takara (witness), 
salat (prayer), zakat (alms), saum (fast-
ing), and hajj (pilgrimage). The religion 
is a means by which to achieve divine 
grace and encompasses a wide-ranging 
set of attitudes and practices. Some of 
these are deemed praiseworthy within the 
ummah while others are merely tolerated. 
Important in the story of Islam in the 
southern Philippines has been the role of 
Sufism (or Islamic mysticism). This mani-
festation of the spiritual relies upon the 
survival of traditional socio-economic 
structures. It does not flourish in the mod-
em world. Sufism provides the mystical 
experience of an internalised relationship 
between the adherent and a personal God 
akin to similar forms of contemplation in 
other religions, although Islam actually 
encourages such encounters because it 
does not require priestly mediation. 
'Sufism served to enrich Islam with many 
strains of cultural and social expression 
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and liberated its common folk into a self-
transcending intensity of spiritual life 
they could have reached in no other way', 
Kenneth Cragg has enth~sed. 'With its 
manifold energies of soul, its strenuous 
demands and its vast diffusion through 
the lands and centuries of Islam, the life 
of the Sufi Orders might lay claim to be-
ing the finest achievement of Islamic re-
ligion'20. 
In part a counter to the cold and eru-
dite rationalism of scholarly pursuit, 
Sufism has developed over centuries as a 
means to personal enlightenment and the 
realisation of divine glory. It has been de-
scribed variously as a type of disciplined 
vocation and the path to a life of devo-
tion. Sufism has assumed many forms. 
One of these is Naqshabandiyyah 
(founded by Muhammad Naqshabandi, 
who died in 1389 AD). Itself a collection 
of divergent groups, Naqshabandiyyah 
spread early to the southern Philippines. 
Although eclectic and discursive, 
Sufism responded with revulsion to moral 
laxity among secular Muslims. It has pro-
vided a q1.1iet, gentle alternative to West-
ernising influences. There have been 
three major impulses for change. The first 
of these comprises the internal dynamics 
of the Bangsamoro itself. The ethnic, re-
ligious, socio-political, and economic cul-
tures of this diverse region create a 
vibrant faith while providing a remark-
able counterpoint to the dominant Philip-
pine society. The second point has 
emerged from the range of hostile forces 
brought to bear against the Moro commu-
nities. Chief among these is the Philippine 
government. A final factor involves the ri-
valry between the previous two; namely, 
the essentially dynamic mechanism of ac-
tion and reaction which has arisen in the 
recent past. Much of what the Islamic 
leaders dedde to do is a response to gov-
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emment initiatives; administrative policy 
in tum being a reflection of the fonner. 
Everything is a cause as well as an effect 
in the evolution of the RP-Muslim dia-
logue. 
At the same time, however, critics dis-
miss Islam as an imported faith lightly im-
posed upon what is still essentially a 
missionary environment. One of the more 
obvious reasons that Islam in the southern 
Philippines has often been presented as a 
foreign influence is its persistent reliance 
upon external inputs for religious instruc-
tion, explanatory literature, trained schol-
ars and the like. 1his has been a major 
hindrance in the propagation of the faith 
and its ultimate emergence as an indige-
nous creed. 
Significant efforts have been made to 
rectify the situation through various types 
of neo-revivalism. The Tableeqh Jwnaat 
movement, for instance, was fonned in 
the early 1980s as an expression of relig-
ious renewal. While it espouses a. return 
to strict Islamic observance, the organisa-
tion resembles a middle way between tra-
ditionalism and modernity. Essentially an 
apolitical force with perhaps 300,000 
young members, it has on several occa-
sions run foul of the Philippine military 
and Christian vigilantes likeAlsa Moro. 
Radicalisation has occurred in the face of 
an extremist brutality condoned or ig-
nored by the authorities. Amilhussin Ju-
maani,' a founder of Tableeqh Jumaat, 
subsequently rejected peaceful initiatives 
and helped to establish the notorious Abu 
Sayyaf[Swordbearer of Allah]. 
The Islamic experience in the south un-
doubtedly poses a direct threat to the Phil-
ippine state. As Samuel Tan has noted: 
The Moros of the Philippines are engaged in 
a struggle for an autonomous government in 
a separate territory. Believing that they are a 
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different people with a unique history and val-
ues, they assert that, by the fact of their 
uniqueness as a nation, they have the right to 
self-determination. The Moros have sought 
their objectives for many centuries having en-
dured deprivation, exploitation, and oppres-
. d I z· . 21 szon un er severa a zen regzmes . 
The acquisition of the Ishimic faith 
was itself an indication of the Moro abil-
ity to adapt to change. 
The spread of the faith to the southern 
Philippines and its penetration of this part 
of the archipelago amply illustrate the ex-
tent of Islamic diversity and dispersal. 
One strand of the faith has remained 'an 
oppositional Islam', fiercely resisting in-
roads of Spanish Catholicism first, then 
the Protestantism of the Americans, and 
finally the dictates of conformity imposed 
by the Philippine state. Edward Said has 
noted a general trend in which Muslim 
groups gain a mandate from 'the op-
pressed, the urban poor, the landless peas-
ants of the countryside, all those with no 
hope except a restored or reconstructed Is-
lamic past'. He could be writing specifi-
., cany about the Moro communities of 
Mindanao. And he has warned: 'Many 
people are ready to fight to the death for 
these ideas'22. 
Islam in the southern Philippines has 
gradually become a minority religion in a 
fiercely contested but Christianised area 
of a predominantly Catholic country. 
Even here, however, Islamic leaders re-
flected the pattern of quietism and submis-
sion to secular authority prevalent in 
many Muslim states. Emmanuel Sivan 
has noted succinctly: 
While the ravages of modernity were quite im-
portant, it is clear that traditional/slam still 
held its ground in certain key areas. The re-
vival evident since the mid-1960s, and whose 
goal had been to stop the erosion, could oper-
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ate from a solid enough basis, deeply steeped 
in medieval lore and behaviour. This is not to 
minimise the contribution of the radicals, nor 
to say that their holding operation did not im-
ply departure from traditionalism in certain 
spheres. The pivotal departure is the passage 
from what one may call 'passive pessimism' 
to 'activist pessimism', analogous perhaps to 
differences between Old Right and New Right 
in turn-of-the-century Europe23. 
The radicals of today recognise the on-
set of decadent trends along with the dam-
age wrought upon Islamic societies by 
modernity, but they refuse to succumb to 
the quietism and submission advocated by 
mainstream leaders. 
There is some validity to the claim that 
radical Islam is selectively receptive to 
modernism, basing its response upon a no-
tion of essentialism (or 'Orientalism in re-
verse')24.In other words, a corpus of the 
true faith can be relied upon to withstand 
the impact ofWestemising modernity. 
Such might very well be the case in re-
gard to Islam itself, where revivalism has 
been most effective. Studies have re-
vealed that even where change has oc-
curred in sensitive areas like the family, 
education, and the status of women, relig-
ious matters have been the most resistant 
fi . 25 to trans onnatmn . 
A useful measure of Islam in the south-
em Philippines has been provided in the 
conclusion to one of Kenneth Cragg's 
careful studies. Reflecting on the tragic as-
pect of Islam, he noted: 
It is a faith which has, historically, lived in 
and by success. It is a religion of confident 
power. Since it sees itself as religion per-
fected, it believes it is destined always to suc-
ceed. The sympathetic observer is moved to 
wonder whether it is ever seriously afflicted 
or ill at ease in the world. I slam expects the 
believer to be free from raibah, doubtfulness, 
of which there is none in the Qur' an. Yet a 
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faith which never produces any loyal sceptics 
must seem to be 'out of this world'. Without 
inward doubters can any religion be safe even 
with itself? Do not all credal establishments · 
need iconoclasts to call them into question? ... 
If there is an unexaminedness about belief, it 
means that there is a conspiracy of silence 
about latent, haunting questions. Islam has al-
ways been rigorous a?Jtnst apostasy, impa-
tient with the doubtful . 
Cragg's words have gained in rele-
vance and potency since he wrote them in 
1975. But they only apply to the Islam of 
Mindanao in perverse and particular ways. 
Yet Islam has produced a number of 
famous sceptics, despite the intolerance 
with which they have been met. And the 
lived experience of millions of Muslims 
have not reflected the optimistic assur-
ances of their faith. Indeed, Cragg's own 
analysis readily conceded that the self-evi-
dent complacency of Islam was often con-
tradicted by the ineluctable flow of 
history. 
Despite ethno-linguistic and other 
tribal differences, Moro communities 
have achieved and maintained a signifi-
cant degree of shared nationhood. The 
adopted religion actually strengthened 
many indigenous elements of their soci-
ety. As T.J.S.George noted in his Revolt 
in Mindanao, the popular creed of the 
south gained adherents in a way entirely 
different to the faith imposed by the Span-
ish elsewhere in the archipelago. 'Mus-
lims achieved a sense of identity which 
Catholics did not', he decided. 'In fact, 
the Catholics lost theirs because they 
were consciously Hispanized; the Mus-
lims were never Arabized '27. 
After reading Revolt in Mindanao, the 
tireless ecumenical activist Fr Peter Gere-
mia confided to his diary that it was an in-
teresting study 'sympathetic with the 
Muslim suspicion toward a nation suppos-
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edly independent but still named after 
Philip, the colonizer, with a flag copied 
from the American flag, and a national an-
them borrowed from a Spanish royal 
march - not to mention the colonial educa-
tion, economy and political system'. Gere-
mia wondered whether the Muslims were 
'challenging the rest of the nation to at-
tempt independence again '28• 
Yet George's study tends to be sub-
limely and unapologetically modernist in 
its message: 'As a community, Mindanao 
Muslims have remained static for too 
long, their own inward-looking disposi-
tion and reactionary leadership contribut-
ing as much to that condition as 
oppression by outsiders'. Having praised 
the Kemalist nation-building experiment 
in Turkey, George challenged the Mus-
lims of the Philippines to 'become the 
pace-setting ''Turks" of South-East Asia'. 
He is particularly critical of those Moro 
leaders who have blocked attempts at re-
fonn, although he appears reluctant to rec-
ognise this excessive conservatism as a 
generalised Philippine problem. 'All or-
thodoxies must change in time, or time 
overwhelms them', he concludes. 'Min-
danao still awaits a Mustafa Kemal'29. 
There is a slight arrogance about such 
pontification. Indeed, the certainty of 
much previous research has been chal-
lenged over the last few years and aca-
demic attitudes have begun to moderate a 
little. 'Scholarly concern with the Islamic 
roots of culture and politics is very re-
cent', declared Edmund Burke, III. 
'Dominated by the paradigm of modern-
ization, the academic literature until quite 
recently stressed the impact upon Islamic 
elites of European ideas and cultural mod-
els'. Burke has pointed out how national-
ism became the dominant ideology of the 
Muslim world. 'Today, in the wake of the 
Islamic revival', he decided, 'we are in-
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clined to wonder if the concern with secu-
lar nationalism was all a mirage '30. 
The situation in the southern Philip-
pines must be fitted into the general dis-
cussion about Islam and modernity. An 
especially critical feature today is the ten-
sion between secularising forces and a 
process of heightened Islamisation. Two 
important aspects of the fonner have been 
the countervailing influences of Marxism 
and Westemisation. According to some 
imams, Marxism has assumed a decep-
tively Islamic veneer in Moroland. A 
number of religious leaders have attacked 
Chainnan Nur Misuari for his leftist incli-
. nations and criticised the MNLF for nego-
tiating from time to time with the New 
People's Anny (NPA), the armed wing of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines 
(CPP). 
Complaints about Westemisation 
range far more widely. Virtually anything 
which excites impressionable youth or 
threatens social disturbance of any sort 
quickly earns the disapproval of aging 
ulama in centers like the Islamic City of 
Marawi and is rejected out of hand as a 
challenge to the true faith. Such dogma-
tism is asserted with an increasing degree 
of doctrinal certitude. Quoting the Holy 
Qur' an - 'Truth hath come and falsehood 
hath vanished [Surah 17: 81]- to buttress 
their heavy-handed actions, these theolo-
gians struggle to maintain a religious pu-
rity based upon stasis, resignation, and a 
pessimistic acceptance that the world is 
largely as decreed by Allah. 
Ethnolinguistic differences were al-
ways extremely significant in Moroland, 
though these have changed enonnously 
over time. But with the decline of tradi-
tional customs, the incursions of various 
external influences, and the arrival of 
large numbers of Visayan settlers, Islamic 
systems of kinship, tenitorial jurisdiction, 
so 
and the like have come under extraordi-
nary pressure. In some parts of Sulu-Min-
danao, these established patterns have 
survived in modified form; elsewhere 
they have not. 
The gradual breakdown of Islamic cus-
toms has occurred in many ways and for a 
variety of reasons. Yet the culture of 
Moroland has proved exceptionally resil-
ient. It is ~so vital and diverse. The prac-
tices in one valley may not remain the 
same and might not be reflected in those 
of a neighbouring district. Nor has direct 
attack been sufficient to cause social dislo-
cation. In some cases, indeed, a tribalism 
or communal reassertion based upon Is-
lamic renewal has become an important 
form of political resistance31. 
A distinctive feature of Islam in the 
southern Philippines has been its remark-
able growth in recent times. Early in the 
twentieth century there were only about 
fifty mosques in the entire country. A 
rapid period of expansion occurred in the 
1970s, the number of mosques increasing 
to nearly 1500 by 1983. Today through-
out Mindanao, even the smallest commu-
nity has its own tiny mosque just as 
thatched-hut Catholic churches are a dis-
tinctive feature of most villages, too. The 
number of madrasah schools doubled dur-
ing the eighties to over 2000. A couple of 
thousand people each year now make the 
hajj (or pilgrimage to Mecca). 
This religious fervour has been aptly 
described as a form of 'muscular Is-
lam'32. It is concerned· with vigorous pros-
elytising, winning over not so much 
'converts' as 'reverts'. This notion of re-
version is very important as many ummah 
dispute the historical record and argue 
that the entire. archipelago was Muslim be-
fore the arrival of Christendom. 
The growth of Islam in this place and 
at this time requires careful study. Does 
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the Bangsamoro comprise or form part of 
an 'imagined community'? Or does it dis-
sipate into too many nipa huts, herds of 
goats, village wells - and, of course, 
madrasahs and mosques? In his influen-
tial study of nationality/nation-ness/na-
tionalism, Ben Anderson confronted 
aspects of lslamism, albeit with less than 
complete success. Are we truly to believe 
that Maguindanaons and Berbers commu-
nicate in Mecca because their ideographs 
are written in classical Arabic?33 While 
much of Anderson's concept remains pro-
vocative, .it seems to lack sufficient elas-
ticity to be fully convincing in this case. 
An adequate explanation must acknow-
ledge a number of factors. In his provoca-
tive /slams and Modernities, Aziz 
Al-Azmeh has cautioned against a range 
of careless simplifications. His lament is 
about misunderstanding: 
Whatever is construed as itself rational never 
goes beyond the bounds of the singular event 
to which it relates. Islamic history thus be-
comes, at best, a ponderous tragedy, at worst 
a soap opera, and in all cases a misadven-
ture. Decline thus becomes not a fact of the 
historical order, but a predictable event of the 
metaphysical order. Decline is here not essen-
tially a historical fact, but is natural given the 
antithetical conception of Islam employed: the 
antithesis of normalcy and nature is anomaly 
and disnature. Decline becomes metaphysi-
cally necessary, a foregone conclusion under-
lined by an actual disparity in might. That 
racist stereotypes and historical justification 
are concordant comes as no surprise. 
Too often those who examine Islam 
from outside 'espouse a savage essential-
ism' which insists 'that a rigourist form of 
religiosity is the characteristic, the real'. 
Al-Azmeh concludes rather obtusely: 
'Fundamentalists realize the wildest fanta-
sies of orientalism; for the former, as for 
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the latter, the striving is for a myth of ori-
gin'34. 
A number of writers have perceived a 
Manichean disjunction in this regard. At 
one level, modernisation is no more than 
an Orientalising mentality. Turkish writer 
Nevzat Soguk has noted that even critical 
and sensitive writers like Edward Said 
and Gayatri Spivak, anxious 'to reappro-
priate an indigenous capacity to speak, 
might find themselves to be the unwitting 
agents of a new kind of "corrective pro-
ject" outlining the qualities of a "heroic" 
Third World subject'. Soguk has written 
in scathing terms about 'Orientalised Ori-
entals' who seek to transform their Is-
lamised sites in the image of modernity, 
progress, and development. 
Or again, Soguk has warned against 
fashionable notions of resistance defined 
merely in terms of the periphery against 
the center. Such subjectivity may appear 
to condone indisputably evil deeds. He 
warns against the inherent dangers of pro-
claiming (and then imposing) the correct 
path to salvation. The present activities of 
Abu Sayyaf in southwestern Mindanao 
and further afield serve notice that anti-
Western postures are not sufficient to 
achieve genuine liberation and that an ur-
. gent need persists for engaged criticism 
of such forms of Islamic resistance (or 
what Edward Said has labelled more 
broadly 'sectarian nativism ')35. 
The Moro struggle has acquired three 
distinct types of internal consolidation. 
First came the evolution of ethnic iden-
tity. A unity of effort was achieved 
through kinship, language, and location. 
'What this means', according to Samuel 
Tan, 'is that the persistence of the ethnic 
factor indicates not so much the anti-mod-
ern or anti-progressive nature of Muslim 
aspirations as it is a means of survival in a 
society where nationalism has remained 
parochial and prejudiced'. 
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Religious identity also developed as a 
response to the inroads of colonialism. 
Hispanicisation implied conversion to Ca-
tholicism. Later the Americans sought to 
replace this with a healthy dose of 
Methodism. Confronted by Christianisa-
tion in one form or another, ethnicity was 
augmented by the tenets of Islam. 
The third factor has been a search for 
national identity. While Muslims strive 
for recognition within the Philippine pol-
ity, they also realise that their culture and 
heritage binds them to the broader Islamic 
tradition. Samuel Tan has declared the 
Bangsamoro to be at a crossroad. The 
Moros confront two realities: 
First, the outside world which represents the 
larger society has definitely and irreversibly 
followed the path of modernization, sacrific-
ing some, if not many, of its traditional ways 
and features. As such, it has increased its re-
sources, powers, and knowledge ... Second, 
history as a teacher of men points 110t only to 
the desirable answers of the past but also to 
its weaknesses, and the lessons of history 
must lead to better understanding of present 
problems and more effective ways to cope 
with anxieties,fears and frustrations. 
Tan believes that Moros can only se-
cure their identity by resolving this di-
lemma. But having posed the great 
challenge for the people of Muslim Min-
danao, he resorts in the end to vague ecu-
menical platitudes instead of suggesting a 
feasible way forward36• 
How much further can general theoris-
ing go except to caution against various 
pitfalls - like, for example, the warnings 
of Bhikhu Parekh, who has noted the 'ten-
dency to use the term fundamentalism as 
a kind of hand grenade to be thrown at 
whoever is not whole-heartedly commit-
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ted to liberal values'37• Not that an Is-
lamic liberalism is inherently contradic-
tory. The hegemonic West simply endows 
itself with greater objectivity than its East-
ern rivals, trivialising in a myriad of ways 
the allegedly barbaric history of Muslim 
peoples. 
In the southern Philippines as else-
where, Muslim leaders have been able to 
attribute communal setbacks and rever-
sals of fortune to religious laxity, the solu-
tion being a return to the basic principles 
of the faith and a rejection of secularism 
in all its seductive trappings. Such teach-
ings underlie the persistent call to jihad, it-
self a complicated tenn for struggle 
which is only slighted by the glib interpre-
tation as Holy War. Much of the be-
liever's obligation occurs within the self 
-Greater Jihad- as opposed to fighting 
the external enemies of the ummah -
Lesser Jihad. 
The significance of the Islamic strug-
gle in the southern Philippines cannot be 
doubted. In his lengthy study of Muslim 
separatism, W.K.Che Man points to the 
validity of ethnic, religious, and national-
ist demands. He concludes forcefully that 
the people of Moroland regard their na-
tional self-detennination as a fundamental 
right38. Perhaps Muslim Mindanao needs 
the sort of extra-electoral, self-critical left-
ward-leaning fonnation which leads by ra-
tional persuasion rather than by 
domination. This reincarnation of Gram-
sci's 'modern prince' probably accords 
closely to the vision of MNLF Chainnan 
Nur Misuari. · 
Despite all its religious overtones, 
analysis of the Moro struggle must con-
stantly be linked to the reality of Philip-
pine politics. One commentator has 
noted: 'Political analysts err in concentrat-
ing all their attention on the burning, mili-
tant Islam in plain sight; other 
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manifestations of Islam deserve to be 
more closely examined and better known 
to the public at large'39. Nevertheless, it 
can be difficult for the academic observer 
to make sense of Islamic resurgence in 
the southern Philippines when such revi-
valism intersects with anned struggle, kid-
nappings and banditry, massacres and the 
sacking of cities like Ipil, and the advent 
of the violent, wrathful jihad of Abu 
Sayyaf and other Moro 'lost commands'. 
Yet, as Kenneth Bauzon has stressed, 
'the conflict between the Muslims and the 
Philippine government is not so much 
caused by guns and bullets as by conflict-
ing conceptions of nationality, each of 
which fonns part ·or a larger set of be-
liefs'. The differences between the war-
ring parties relate to varying cosmologies 
that too seldom intersect or overlap. 
Bauzon concluded: 
Clearly, the Muslims in the Philippines have 
been the victims - not the perpetrators -of his-
torical circumstances. It is ironic that to a 
large extent their fate has been determined by 
false images masquerading as 'knowledge', 
much of it purveyed by the social sciences ... 
This intellectual climate, in turn, influenced 
the Christian Filipino intelligentsia with re-
spect to the way they defined and found solu-
tion to their 'Moro Problem'40• 
Those community leaders with suffi-
cient clarity of vision and the requisite ca-
pacity for goodwill are clearly confronted 
by a divide which is both deep and wide. 
A far more basic challenge is con-
tained in the urgent simplicity of Moro de-
mands. Their religion has come to 
represent and encapsulate the plight of the 
multifarious communities of the southern 
Philippines. These have already begun to 
redefine their past and reconstruct their 
present as the only means of reinventing 
their future. If this task fails, the aspira-
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tions of the Moro people will not lie dor-
mant.· Vast armies of mujahideen are now 
being recruited from the orphans of those 
who died in the fighting of the 1970s and 
other disaffected youth. The debate as to 
whether theirs will be a religious war or a 
struggle for national liberation seems ster-
ile, dangerous, and unnecessarily compli-
cated. The hopes and dreams of the 
Muslims of Mindanao are quite straight-
forward: Above all, in the inspired words 
of Aime Cesaire, they want to be assured 
of a place at the rendezvous of victory. 
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A dozen pages in the middle of my re-
view copy are blank. That is appropriate, 
perhaps: the Islamic Desk Reference 
leaves too many gaps untilled. 
Every encyclopaedia is bound to fail; 
its editors neglect or exclude just those 
items which will prompt readers to con-
sult their published work. How much 
more vulnerable, then, is a digest of an en-
cyclopedia! Under the entry, 'Proverbs', 
this particular digest explains that 'the 
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I have not seen the multi-volume Ency-
clopaedia of Islam. Nevertheless, I will 
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